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7 The theory of credit and 
macroeconomic stability 
Joseph Stiglitz* 
The post-2008 world has been one dominated by monetary policy, as 
politics and ideology - and sometimes financial markets - constrain 
the use of fiscal policy. There have been massive increases in the bal-
ance sheets of key central banks - the Federal Reserve's reaching 
25 percent (2016) of GDP, Japan, 82 percent (2016), the Bank of 
England, 21 percent (2016), and the ECB, late to embark on quan-
titative easing, but as of 2016 already over 31 percent of GDP. But 
in spite of these increases, the best that can be said is that monetary 
policy prevented matters from becoming worse; growth in GDP in the 
advanced countries was an anemic 2 percent. 
The growth in base money has become disjointed from the growth 
in the economies. Figure 7.1 shows the growth in central bank assets 
and the growth in real GDP for each of the four countries. Rather than 
GDP growing proportionately to the growth of the central bank balance 
sheet, the figure shows significant variability in the ratio of central bank 
assets to GDP, and especially large changes in the money supply being 
associated with small changes in nominal GDP in recent years in the US. 
A simple regression shows a very low correlation between money 
supply and GDP in recent years, weaker than in the period immedi-
ately after World War IL This weak relationship appears robust to 
a variety of specifications, including variable lags and different mea-
sures of money (e.g. the Fed's balance sheet or more standard measures 
of M2 - see Figure 7.2). These results naturally raise the questions: 
* This is a chapter prepared for the volume in honour of Deepak Nayyar, from whom 
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years. The author is indebted to the Institute for New Economic Thinking for finan-
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Figure 7.1 Central bank assets~to~GDP ratio 
Ratio of central bank assets to GDP has varied markedly1 
Source: Federal Reserve Economic Database (FRED) (https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2} 
where is the extra liquidity provided by the Fed going? What's hap-
pening? Standard theory suggests putting more money into people's 
pockets should lead to more spending, leading either to higher prices 
or greater output. If this isn't happening, it suggests a fundamental 
flaw with standard formulations of monetary theory. 
The absence of a clear link between money (however measured) and 
output (nominal or real) has led naturally to a shift of attention of 
monetary authorities away from quantitative measures (base money~ 
Ml, etc.) to a focus on interest rates. But even here, without further 
massaging of the data, the relationship is weak. The Appendix dis-
cusses the weak relationship between output (nominal and real) and 
money supply and interest rates (nominal and real). Our empirical 
investigation suggests, moreover, that the relationship has not been 1 , 
stable over time. In particular, the relationship between money and 
output has become weaker in the last quarter of a century. As the later 
analysis makes clear, this should not come as a complete surprise: there 
have been large changes in institutional arrangements, and one might 
have expected such institutional changes to be reflected in the relation-
ships discussed in the Appendix. 
In the aftermath of the Great Recession, there is a growing consen-
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monetary policy. Central banks may have prevented another Great 
Depression, but they have not restored the economy to robust growth. 
Our analysis suggests that this experience sheds broader light on the 
limitations of monetary policy. The first part of the chapter provides 
an explanation for this extraordinary ineffectiveness of monetary pol-
icy, and in doing so provides a new framework for thinking about 
money and finance. 
The second part of the chapter builds on the insights of the first part 
and shows how advances in technology allow for the creation of an 
electronic monetary system that enables better macroeconomic man-
agement and a greater share of the rents associated with "money", that 
is, with the payments system, to be captured for the public treasury. 
Towards a new theory of money and credit2 
Standard modern monetary theory is based on the hypothesis that the 
T-bill rate is the central variable in controlling the economy, and that 
the money supply, which the government controls, enables the govern-
ment to regulate the T-bill rate. 
Prevailing economic doctrines earlier argued that there was a simple 
link between the supply of money (say M2 ), which the government 
could control, and the value of nominal GDP. This link is described 
by the equation: 
(1) MVo=pQ 
where, V is the velocity of circulation, p is the price level and Q is 
real output. (1) is essentially a definition of the velocity of circulation. 
Monetarism translated ( 1) from a definition into an empirical hypoth-
esis, arguing that V was constant. This meant that nominal income and 
the money supply moved in proportion. 
Monetarists like Milton Friedman claimed further that (at least over 
the long run) Q was fixed at full employment, so that an increase in 
M would lead to a proportionate increase in p. Shortly after these 
monetarism doctrines became fashionable, especially in central banks, 
the links between money supply (in virtually any measure), and the 
variables describing the economy (income, or even real interest rates) 
seemed to become tenuous. The velocity of circulation was evidently 
not a constant. Of course, there never had been a theory explaining. _ 
why it should be. 
Even before this, Keynesians had argued that V was a function of the 
interest rate. An increase in Mis split in three ways - an increase in p, 
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n increase in Q and a decrease in velocity - with the exact division ~epending on th~ relevant elasticities (e.g. the intere.st elasticity of the 
demand for money, of investment, and of consumpt10n.) 
But, beginning in the 1980s, velocity was not only notrnnstant, but 
it also did not appear to be even a stable function. of the mterest rate -
not a surprise given, as we have noted, the large :nst1tut1onal changes 
going on in the financial sector (such as the creat10n of money market 
funds and the abolition of many regulations). The natural response 
was a switch from a focus on the quantity of money to the .interest rate. 
But while this experience should have led to a deeper rethmkmg of the 
premises of monetary theory, it did not. . . 
Prevailing theories also held that monetary policy provided the best 
(most effective, least distortionary) re.gulator of the economy, and that 
the way it did this was through adiustmg the interest rate. A low-
ering of the interest rate led to more consumption and 1~vestment. 
Jn an open economy, it led to a lower exchange rate, which led. to 
more exports. The extraordinary ineffectiveness of monetary policy 
to restore the economy to full economy in the aftermath of the Great 
Recession has led to a modification of the standard theory: monetary 
policy is the instrument of choice so long as the economy is above 
the zero lower bound (ZLB); and to the extent that the ZLB can be 
breached, it should be. . 
This chapter questions the primacy given to monetary policy, 
suggesting that the problem is not the ZLB, but a host of other 
limitations - effects of monetary policy that were given short shrift. 
Most fundamentally, we argue that standard theory has given too 
much attention to the interest rate and too little attention to the pri-
mary mechanism through which monetary policy affects the economy, 
the quantity and terms (including the non-pnce terms) at which. credit 
is available. Jn normal times, money and credit represent two sides of 
a bank's balance sheet, so they may be highly correlated. But more .gen-
erally and especially in crises, credit may be only weakly related either 
to th~ supply of money, or even to the T-bill interest rate. This weak 
link - and not the ZLB - helps explain the ineffectiveness of mon-
etary policy at certain times, such as the period from 2008 through the 
present. We further argue that the expansion of credit itself is weakly 
linked to GDP, with increases in credit going towards multiple uses 
other than an increase in the demand for produced goods - most nota-
bly, towards the acquisition of assets such as land. . 
The discussion in this section is spread across seven subsections. 
After setting out the basic argument for the focus on er.edit in the first, 
we turn to the determinants of the supply of credit - pnmanly through 
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the banking system, observing that changes in monetary policy may 
be limited in overcoming other changes in the determinants of credit 
availability, in the second. The third focuses on the demand for credit 
noting that there are many other uses to which credit can be put othe; 
than an increased demand for produced goods. The fourth then turns 
to a more expansive explanation of the ineffectiveness of monetary 
policy. The fifth subsection explains that the distortionary effects of 
monetary policy may be far greater than earlier analyses have assumed· 
for instance, the conventional use of an aggregative model hides inter~ 
sectoral distortions. The sixth argues, by the same token, that there 
may be serious adverse distributional effects which cannot be ignored, 
and which contribute to the ineffectiveness of monetary policy. The sev-
enth reexamines these issues from the perspective of an open economy, 
explaining why monetary policy may be more or less effective, and 
more or less distortionary, with a different set of distributive effects. 
The analysis of the relative ineffectiveness of monetary policy pro-
vides the background for the second part of the chapter, where we 
show how a move to an electronic banking system, combined with a 
direct focus on credit availability, and the use of new monetary instru-
ments described there, can increase the effectiveness of macroeconomic 
management, even in an open economy. 
The importance of credit - not money 
In earlier work, Greenwald and Stiglitz (1991, 2003) argued that what 
matters for the level of macroee<:momic activity was neither the supply 
of money (the quantity variable upon which monetarism was focused), 
nor the T-bill rate (the rate of interest that the government had to pay 
on its short-term bonds, and the focus of recent monetary policy), 
but rather the availability of credit and the terms at which credit is 
available. They thus criticized standard monetary theory in terms of 
its theory of the determination of the lending rate, the relevance of the 
T-bill rate, and the assumption that credit markets always clear. 
In the standard model, the interest rate is determined by the intersec-
tion of the demand and supply for money. Government controls the 
supply of money. In that model, the demand for money is related to 
income and the interest rate (with the interest rate being the opportunity 
cost of holding money). But G-S point out that in a modern economy, 
most money is interest bearing (e.g. money market funds), with the 
cost of holding money a matter solely of transactions costs, unrelated 
to either monetary policy or the level of economic activity3 (see Fig-
ure 7.3). Moreover, money is not required for engaging in transactions, 
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Figure 7.3 The relationship between T-bill rate and money market rate 
The two track each other almost perfectly, the difference being largely transac-
tions cost, with no significant cyclical component. 
Source: Federal Reserve Economic Database (FRED) (T-bill: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/ 
series/TB3MS; 
BlackRock: www.sec.gov/ Archives/edgar/data/65109/000119 31251642601 O/d79618 
d497k.htm) 
but rather for credit. Even if money were required for transactions, 
most transactions are exchanges of assets, and not directly related t~ 
the production of goods and services; hence t~e der:i~nd f,~r ;,noney is 
related not just to the level of macroeconomi_c activity I Y '.GDP), 
but to other kinds of transactions, and there 1s no fix.ed relat10nsh1p 
between these and GDP. There is, in short, no theoretical foundat10n 
underlying the usual theory of interest determination. . 
Robertson4 had earlier proposed an alternative theory of mterest 
determination, based on the demand and supply of savings. Some 
farmers decide not to consume or plant all their seeds, and some wish 
to use more than the seeds they have available, and the interest rate 
equilibrates the supply and demand of "loanable" seeds (see Green-
wald and Stiglitz 2003 ). While such a theory may .have made sense m 
a primitive agriculture economy, it does not describe a ~od.er~ credit 
economy, where banks are central and can create cred1: w1th1n con-
straints imposed by the government. In particular, t~ere is no need for 
a bank to have seeds on deposit for it to create credit. 
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. While there is thus a lacuna in the theory of interest rate determina-
tion, even were we to have a well-developed theory, with a clear link betwee~ the mterest rate and monetary policy, there is a further prob-
lem: it is not clear that the T-bill rate (so determined) plays the criti 1 
role assumed. in mo~ern macro and monetary theory. First, as ~~ 
show, the T-b.111 rate is only loosely related to the lending rate.' More-
over, the lendmg rate is not the only variable affecting macroeconom' 
activity. With credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981), the availabi~~ 
1ty of c~ed1t matters too, as do other non-price terms of credit con-
tracts (like collateral requirements; Stiglitz and Weiss 1986).' These 
are endogenous, and while they may be affected by the T-bill rate, the 
are also affected by other policy and environmental variables. In shor[ 
modern ~acroeconomics has focused on certain substitution effect~ 
(e.g. the mterest elasticity of consumption), and these may be (and we 
would suggest typically are) overwhelmed by income, wealth, risk, and 
?ther non-price effe~ts? 7 or price effects operating in other ways, for 
instance through their impact on collateral, self-selection, or incentive 
compatibility constraints. 
The correlation between money and credit 
Our analysis emphasizes the role of credit in determining the level 
of economic activity. For a variety of reasons, data on the money 
supply (measured somehow) seems more widely available than data 
on credit, either its "availability" or even the actual level of lending. 
But these vanables are closely related: typically, when a bank lends 
more, its deposits (or more broadly, the deposits of the banking sys-
tem) increase (a liability) and so do the bank's assets - the loan. Thus, 
money (demand deposits) and credit increase in tandem. So too, if a 
foreigner were to make a deposit in a country's bank, the bank would 
normally have an incentive and ability to increase lending. 
But as we explain later, there are times when this normal relation-
ship breaks down, and policies predicated on the normal relationships 
may be very misguided. If a bank faces a great deal of uncertainty, it 1 
may not lend out as much as it could; it has excess reserves. In the East 
Asia crisis, the IMF became worried when, say, there were large excess 
reserves in Indonesia. It meant that, suddenly, the banks could start 
lending, and that would be inflationary. As a precautionary measure, 
it thought it was wise to "mop up" the excess reserves or to take other 
actions to eliminate the excess reserves, for example, tighten reserve 
requirements. The problem was that with the blunt instruments avail-
able, even banks that had no excess reserves were typically affected by 
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the tightening. Their customers lost access to credit - deepening the 
on-going recession. The cost of tightening was palpable;. the ~isk of 
inflation that the tightening was. supposed to reduce was imagmary -
there was virtually no realistic scenario in which the banks with excess 
reserves would turn around and lend so much that inflation would be 
excessive. 
Economies in deep downturns - recessions and depressions - behave 
differently than those in more normal times, and policies, including 
and especially monetary policies, suitable for one situation may not 
be suitable for the other (see Stiglitz 2016d). Even if the correlat10n 
between money and credit were close in normal times, it is not in deep 
downturns, as banks are willing to hold on to excess reserves. As we 
explain later, it is this which gives rise to the modern liquidity trap. 
The supply of credit 
In standard monetary theory, banks play no role. This is true even for 
the models used by central banks - ironic since if there were no banks, 
there would be no central banks. In institution-free Neo-classical eco-
nomics, one sees underneath the institutions to the underlying eco-
nomic forces. Thus, as we have noted, in standard models, the (real) 
interest rate is set at the rate that equilibrates the demand and supply 
of funds (in Robertsonian monetary theory; in Keynesian theory, the 
demand and supply of money8). Though that model may provide a 
reasonable if incomplete9 description of the capital markets on which 
large enterprises raise funds, small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) have to rely on banks, and much of the variability in economic 
activity is related to investment by such enterprises; and much of that 
variability is related to credit availability. 10 Interest rates are not set 
at the intersection of demand and supply curves - there may be credit 
rationing; but even when there is not credit rationing, the supply curve 
of funds needs to be derived from the behavior of banks, and when one 
does that, one gets a very different picture. 
Greenwald and Stiglitz (1991, 1993b, 2003) provide a simple model 
describing bank behavior, showing how lending is related not just to 
the T-bill rate, but to banks' net worth, their risk perceptions, their 
existing portfolio of assets, and the constraints provided by regulators. 
They describe too how banks adjust not only their lending rate, bnt the 
other terms of the contract in response to changes in these variables. 
Thus, credit (money) supply is determined not just by conventional 
monetary instruments (open market operations, reserve requirements), 
but also by macro- and micro-prudential requirements. Indeed, the 
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two aspects of central bank policy (regulatory and macro-control) can-
not and should not be separated. 
Their model of banks (combined with their earlier model of the 
risk-averse firm 11 facing equity rationing; see Greenwald and Sti-
glitz 1993b; Greenwald, Stiglitz, and Weiss 1984) 12 thus shows how 
changes in economic circumstances today (such as a shock that affects 
their net worth or even the value or risk of particular assets13 ) can have 
large, long-lasting effects. The effects of an economic shock can be per-
sistent. At the same time, they explain why an increase in liquidity_ a 
conventional open market operation, lowering the T-bill or the lending 
rate - may have little effect on credit availability. 14 
Banks typically respond to a lower cost of funds by lending more 
and lending at lower interest rates (whether they choose to ration credi; 
or not). But there are some circumstances in Which they do not, or do 
nN do so to any significant extent. In particular, G-S explain why, if 
nsk perceptions have increased and if the risk of the banks' existing 
portfolio has increased - that is, the risk of both new and past loans 
has increased - the bank may be at a corner solution, where it will not 
undertake further loans, even when the interest rate is lowered. And 
this is especial! y so if, due to asymmetric information, the bank can 
only divest itself of the risk associated with past loans by taking large 
capital losses on its loan portfolio. 15 
This problem is exacerbated by the fact that in severe economic 
downturns, the value of highly leveraged banks' net worth is severely 
decreased, so risk-averse banks are even more overly exposed to risk, 
unless they cut back severely on lending. (The inability to divest one-
self of risk generates an important hysteresis effect. There are, in addi-
tion, effects on banks' optimal portfolio, e.g. shifting away from more 
risky lending.) 
Changes in government (central bank) policy, as desirable as they 
may be, typically give rise to new risks, which have their own adverse 
effects even when the intent of the policy change is to stimulate the 
economy. Thus, a decrease in the interest rate changes asset values 
of different firms in different ways, depending on their assets. A firm 
that has outstanding short-term liabilities and long-term assets (with 
returns fixed at a higher rate) may be much better off, but a firm with 
a different maturity structure of assets and liabilities could actually 
be worse off. Lenders may have to have detailed information about 
all the assets and liabilities of a firm to know precisely how each firm 
is affected; and in the absence of that information, uncertainty will 
have increased. Thus, an increase in the interest rate will have a more 
adverse effect than anticipated, but a lowering of the interest rate will 
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have a smaller effect - or even an effect that is adverse. This is espe-
cially so once one takes into account all the general equilibrium effects. 
A lowering of the interest rate will lower the exchange rate, thus hurt-
ing importers and domestic firms that use imported inputs. 
With risk aversion, the benefits of the winners from such changes in 
relative prices do not offset the losses of the losers. The aggregate effect 
can be negative (Greenwald and Stiglitz 1993b). 
The ability and willingness of banks to lend depends not just on 
what may be called the environmental variables (risk perceptions 16 and 
net worth) described in earlier paragraphs, but on all the constraints 
facing banks today - and the expectations of future constraints. For 
instance, banks face capital adequacy constraints, specifying, say, net 
worth relative to outstanding loans. If that constraint is tightened, then 
the bank must either raise new capital or reduce outstanding loans. But 
because of capital market imperfections, firms in fact typically face 
constraints in raising new equity; at the very least, doing so may be 
very costly to existing shareholders. 17 Hence, an increase in the capi-
tal adequacy ratio - or an increase in defaults on loans that reduces 
capital - reduces lending. But because a quick reduction in lending 
may be costly, firms need to anticipate that they might face such a situ-
ation, and hence well before the constraints bind, banks may curtail 
lending and firms may curtail borrowing. 
This simply emphasizes that all of the constraints facing a bank -
whether binding today or possibly binding in the future - can affect 
lending and borrowing today. And it is not just the standard instru-
ments (e.g. open market operations or the discount rate) by which 
central banks affect lending activity. 
Banks that focus on lending to SMEs face an additional problem: 
this lending is typically collateral-based, and the collateral is typically 
real estate. In a crisis such as that of 2008, the value of this collateral 
decreases enormously, and thus, given existing rules and constraints, 
banks should significantly reduce the amount of their exposure to 
SME risk. The focus of the bank is thus on reducing SME exposure, 
not making new loans. 18 
By the same token, severe economic downturns are often associated 
with increased disparities in judgments (probabilities associated with 
different contingencies). This increased disparity in judgments may give 
rise to an increase in trading in existing assets, rather than for newly 
produced assets, and an increase in the demand for credit to support 
such trades. To see this, consider the 2008 crisis. Some believed that 
the market had overshot - real estate prices had fallen excessively. The 
banks argued that that was the case, not wanting to believe that they 
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had made massive misjudgments about the real estate market. The mo 
optimistic market participants believed this contention, and were wi~~ 
ing to pay a risk premium to get access to funds to buy these depressed 
assets. The banks agreed with their judgments (for reasons given in th 
. h e previous sentence). T ese new borrowers could offer the real estate (at 
the new low pnce) as collateral. Thus, from the perspective of the bank 
these new real estate loans offered a low-risk (in their calculus), high'. 
return loan - far better than the high-risk loans to real firms. From the 
perspective of the banks as a group, this lending has a further benefit: it 
raises real estate prices, improving the value of their existing portfolio 19 
In short, in a deep downturn changes in the balance sheet of the 
bank and in its risk perceptions typically lead to a significant contrac-
tion in the supply of funds and an increase in the interest rate that it 
c~arges, and to corresponding changes to its non-price terms; the mag-
rntude of these effects overwhehns any ability of the central bank to 
stimulate lending by lowering interest rates and other actions designed 
to ease credit availability. 
Of course, when we observe a net contraction in lending in a reces-
~ion it does not necessarily mean that monetary policy has been totally 
ineffective: it simply means that it was unable to fully counteract the 
other effects.20 And even when we see an expansion of credit, it does 
not mean that monetary policy has been effective: the expansion of 
credit may not have facilitated the purchase of newly produced goods 
and thus may not have contributed to an increase in GDP. ' 
Moreover, a lowering of interest rates on T-bills does not translate 
into a lowering of the lending rate, and it is that rate that matters for 
firm and consumer behavior. Further, even that rate may not provide 
an adequate description of the financial market: there may be credit 
rationing and collateral and other non-price terms. 
We have even identified some circumstances in which lowering T-bill 
interest rates may be counterproductive (we will identify some further 
circumstances later), because of the increased risk associated with the 
change in interest rates that increases risk perceptions (in association 1· 
with the other relative prices effects generated). By the same token, 
negative interest rates may adversely affect banks' balance sheets if not 
carefully designed, and, in doing so, lead to a contraction in lending.21 
The demand for and uses of credit 
The previous section focused on the determinants of the supply of 
credit, explaining in particular why an "easing" of monetary policy 
might not result in a lower lending rate and a greater availability of 
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credit. Here, we explain why the same thing is also true on the demand 
side: in a severe downturn, risk-averse firms will face an adverse shock 
to their balance sheets and an adverse increase in their risk perceptions, 
both of which will lead to a contraction in production and investment. 
Lowering interest rates at which they can borrow (which is not the 
same as lowering the T-bill rate, as we explained in the previous sec-
tion) may lead them to borrow more than they otherwise would have 
borrowed; but this increase may be small compared to the contraction 
in investment from the increase in risk and worsening of the balance 
sheet. Moreover, even when interest rates are lowered - for those who 
can get loans - credit may be rationed. 
In addition, for reasons explained earlier, changes in interest rates 
by themselves can give rise to an increase in uncertainty, with adverse 
effects on the demand for credit. Each firm is embedded in a com-
plex general equilibrium system, in which it has an array of assets 
and liabilities, some explicit, some implicit, in part related to its 
economic relations with other entities. A marked lowering of inter-
est rates can increase uncertainty and the perception of risk, and 
firm risk management may entail a corresponding adjustment in its 
activities, including decreases in production and investment. Later in 
this chapter, we shall identify some distributional effects of lowering 
interest rates that may also result in a reduction in the demand for 
credit as interest rates fall. 
While a change in interest rates thus may not be effective in increas-
ing the demand for and use of credit, even when it does, the increases 
in credit (money) do not necessarily translate into increases in eco-
nomic activity greater consumption or increased investment in newly 
produced capital goods: there is many a slip between the cup and the 
lip. Increases in credit (money) can go into several uses: 
1 Increased purchases of existing assets, and especially land. Indeed, 
much of increased wealth is an increase in land values - so much 
so that the ratio of the value of produced capital to GDP is actually 
declining. 22 Of course, when more money goes to the purchases 
of land, it does not lead to more land, but rather, to an increase in 
the price of land. This wealth effect can lead to more real spend-
ing, but this effect is normally likely to be small - far smaller than 
that which would have been predicted by any model where it is 
simply assumed that the increase in money leads to more spending 
on produced goods. 
2 Increased margin to facilitate taking larger speculative positions, 
for example, in zero-sum bets, such as futures markets. 
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3 Increased lending abroad (either for "productive" or non-productive 
purposes). If the foreign country to which the money goes has an 
increase in income, it may (slightly) enhance exports, and exports 
may be further strengthened from the effect on foreign exchange. 
(Monetary policy man open economy is discussed briefly further in 
a later subsection.) 
It is, accordingly, not surprising that the link between money and eco-
nomic activity may be much weaker than standard monetary theory 
assumed. 
Limitations on the effectiveness of monetary policy 
Liquidity trap and the Zero Lower Bound (ZLB) 
The Greenwald-Stiglitz analysis provides an alternative explanation 
of the "liquidity trap" to that of Keynes. Keynes' explanation of the 
inefficacy of monetary policy was that because the demand curve for 
short-term government bonds becomes horizontal at low interest rates 
monetary policy could not push interest rates down below a certai~ 
level. Empirically, recent experiences have shown that the interest 
rate on government bonds can even become negative. Our argument 
focuses on banks, and their unwillingness to lend more under certain 
circumstances, no matter how low the T-bill rate is pushed. 
So too, our analysis provides a counter to the recent fixation with 
the constraint on monetary policy imposed by the ZLB. It takes 
the view that even if the intere~t rate were lowered below zero, the 
response would be limited, largely because banks would still not 
increase their lending, partly because banks would not (fully) pass on 
the lower cost of funds to their customers, but partly too because the 
interest elasticity of investment and consumption is low. Of course, 
if the interest rate became negative enough, to the point where indi-
viduals could borrow and effectively never repay, then there would 
be an increase in economic activity. But that is not what advocates 
of the ZLB mean. 
Elsewhere, I have provided other arguments for why the ZLB argu-
ment is questionable: if it were true, there would be other ways of 
achieving the desired change in intertemporal prices, through invest-
ment tax credits and consumption tax rates that change over time. Yet 
no one is proposing such a scheme. Doing so would provide a test of 
the hypothesis, and I believe the ZLB theory would be shown to be 
wanting. 
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Diversion of credit creation and the creation of instability 
our analysis also provides an additional explanation for the ineffec-
tiveness of monetary policy even short of the ZLB: standard monetary 
theory assumes that any additional liquidity created goes towards the 
purchase of produced goods. But, as we have noted earlier, much of 
the additional liquidity does not go to the purchase of newly produced 
assets, but rather into existing fixed assets (such as land), helping cre-
ate credit bubbles, and into institutionally constrained "gambling" 
transactions in futures markets in which some form of margin has to 
be put up. This diversion helps explain the regression findings noted in 
the beginning of this chapter, showing a low correlation between (the 
change in) money and the (change in the) value of output. 
The observation that increases in credit go into increased speculation 
and an increased value of fixed assets helps explain why a low interest 
rate environment is often associated with financial instability. (Other 
reasons are associated with the distortionary effects of monetary policy 
discussed in the next subsection.) Guzman and Stiglitz23 have shown, for 
instance, that increased gambling in futures markets leads to an increase 
in what they call pseudo-wealth: all of the market participants believe 
their wealth goes up as they make more of these bets, simply because 
they expect to win. But the bets are zero sum: the gains of one person 
occur at the expense of others. Still, the extent of such gambles can 
change suddenly, as happened in the lead up to and the aftermath of the 
Great Recession - and thus the amount of pseudo-wealth can change 
quickly, and so too the level of aggregate demand. If monetary or regula-
tory policy tightens, then the extent of such gambles may decrease, and 
so too the value of the pseudo-wealth. The same thing occurs if there 
are changes in perceptions and/or the willingness to engage in such bets. 
Similarly, if credit is used to finance the purchase of fixed assets, 
like land (and/or there is borrowing on the basis of land as collateral), 
an increase in credit can give rise to an increase in the price of land, 
which, if monetary policy is sufficiently accommodating, can lead to 
more lending, fueling further increases in prices. This credit-collateral 
spiral can suddenly break, for example, when market participants no 
longer believe that the price of land will continue to rise - and in fact, it 
can be shown that it is impossible for prices to continue to rise forever 
at the rate necessary to satisfy the capital arbitrage equation (giving 
the same rate of return across all assets). (See Shell and Stiglitz 1967; 
Hahn 1966; Stiglitz 2015b.) 
The problem is not just that additionally provided liquidity goes to 
these purposes, which do not directly lead to an increase in GDP. It is 
I 
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also that the proportion of any additional money that actually goes t 
support GDP is highly variable.24 Hence, without further constraint 0 
monetary authorities cannot be sure about the link between GDP and 
money (credit). 
Of course, if there were a stable relationship between the nominal 
0 
real interest rate and GDP, then it could expand or contract the mone r 
supply. until it reached the targeted interest rate. But the discussions ,?t 
precedmg sect10ns made clear that the relationships were also high! 
variable between the T-bill rate and either the supply or demand foy 
money/credit on the one hand, and between the T-bill rate and the !eve~ 
of economic activity on the other. 25 
Distributive effects 
In a later section we explain how monetary policy may have adverse 
distributive effects. There are winners and losers - but if the reduction 
in spending by the losers is greater than the increase in spending by 
the winners, then the net effect on aggregate demand may be negative 
and these distributive effects may again overwhelm the direct interes; 
rate effect leading each to spend more than they otherwise would have. 
Moreover, the adverse distributive effects may be compounded by the 
rationing effects described earlier: the losers may be forced to contract 
their spending, while the gainers may choose to increase their spend-
ing only a little; and the lower interest rates may then have no effect 
on the former. 
The argument is parallel to that which has become standard in inter-
national economics. There has' long been a concern about persistent 
global imbalances - China's and Germany's surpluses, and the US defi-
cit. The worry is that there will be a "disorderly unwinding" of these 
imbalances - that if global financial markets suddenly stopped being 
willing to finance the deficits of the deficit countries (Calvo 1998), the 
contraction of their spending would not be offset by the expansion of 
the spending of the surplus countries (see Stiglitz 2010). 
Distortionary effects of monetary policy 
Advocates of the use of monetary policy often argue that it is pref-
erable to fiscal policy not only because it can be implemented more 
quickly, but also because it is less distortionary. That is one of the rea-
sons that so many of those economists supporting the view that mon-
etary policy should bear the brunt of macroeconomic adjustment have 
been so disturbed by the inefficacy of monetary policy in recent years, 
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nd why the ZLB argument has become so popular. For it says that 
:heir prior view was correct, but that there is a special "regime" .under 
which, when interest rates hit zero, the results are no .longer applicable. 
But those conclusions are made in the context of highly special mod-
els. In this section, we note several reasons why the co~c.lusion that 
monetary policy should be at the center of macro-stability may be 
wrong. 
Mispricing of risk 
Market participants talk about how the recent low-interest environ-
ment leads to a distorted price of risk. They argue that the low-mterest 
environment leads to a distorted price of risk because of the "search 
for yield", and that, in this low-interest-ra~e environm~nt, .in orde: to 
get "yield" there is excessive demand for nsky assets yield_mg a shght 
risk premium. That drives up the price of these assets, dnvmg down 
risk premiums to irrational levels, which eventually get corrected. 
The consequences of this mispricing have been severe: funds flow 
into uses where, with more rational pricing, they would not go. And 
--the later readjustment of prices can itself have severe consequences. 
But there is a kind of intellectual inconsistency in this perspective. 
Financial market participants typically believe in the efficiency of 
markets. That traditionally has been part of their argument against 
government regulation. But the entire argument for why there is mis-
pricing is based on behavioral finance: market participants fail to rnke 
into account the fact that the irrationally low levels of nsk premmms 
will not be sustained. 
There are risks associated with such market irrationality - but mar-
ket irrationality does not just suddenly appear as interest rates get 
near zero. Market irrationality is pervasive. And because of this, and 
because of the macroeconomic externalities that are associated with 
the consequences of both the excessively low risk premiums and of 
the corrections that follow, there is a need for much greater market 
regulation than advocates of unregulated markets claim. They cannot 
have it both ways: to claim that markets are efficient, but that we need 
to be wary of low interest rates because they create distortions in the 
price of risk. . . . 
They are, however, perhaps correct in their warning a~a1i:ist .low 
interest rates, providing a quite different argument for the hmitat!ons 
of monetary policy than provided by Keynes: it is not that interest 
rates cannot be lowered (indeed, some central banks have lowered 
interest rates below zero); nor is it that lowering interest rates will not 
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have much effect on real economic activity (true, and even, as we argue 
later, worse than that); but that the consequences of low interest rates 
mean that central banks should eschew such policies, especially over 
an extended period of time. 
Inter-sectoral misallocations26 
The aggregate models so beloved by macroeconomists hide a key prob-
lem with the excessive reliance on monetary policy: it gives rise to 
intersectoral distortions. It makes interest-sensitive sectors bear the 
brunt of adjustment. It may be desirable to make such sectors bear 
more of the costs of adjustment than others; but there may be (and 
there typically is) a cost to the reliance on monetary policy. 
Optimal macroeconomic policy would distribute the costs of adjust-
ment, which requires both monetary and fiscal policies.27 
The Ricardo-Barro argument that fiscal policy is ineffective (since 
it will simply be undone by actions in the private sector) rests on sim-
plistic models. Government spending can be complementary to pri-
vate spending (either to private consumption or investment) today, 
and thus affect changes in intertemporal allocations, just as changes 
in intertemporal prices brought on by monetary authorities can. Even 
government spending that is complementary to future private spend-
ing can elicit more private spending today, for example, because con-
sumers rationally take the future impact on their budget constraints 
into their current spending (Neary-Stiglitz 1983).28 
So too, the reliance on using,the short-term interest rate for mac-
roeconomic adjustment may lead (even with full rationality) to dis-
tortions in intertemporal and risk prices (as we noted), and optimal 
macroeconomic adjustment may seek to optimize by minimizing the 
resulting distortions through the use of appropriately designed fiscal 
policies. 29 
Choice of technique: Creating a jobless recovery 
Here, we discuss one piece of evidence that reliance on changing inter-
temporal prices for equilibrating the economy may not be optimal. 
There are many alternative theories attempting to explain why the 
economy fails to attain full employment, including those related to 
wage and price rigidities (with those rigidities in fact being endog-
enous in some variants of these theories). Monetary policy attempts 
to correct for these distortions by controlling the interest rate (usually 
the short-term interest rate), setting it at a level different from what it 
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otherwise would be. But intuitively, if the source of the distortion is in 
the labor or product market, it might make far more sense to attempt 
to correct at least some of the distortion more dire~tly. . . 
The standard argument for monetary policy is that it mcreases 
investment (and possibly consumption) leading to higher GDP and 
thus employment today. But there is another effect: lower mterest ra.tes 
· duce firms to invest in more capital-intensive technologies, lowering ~~ture demand for labor. It affects the choice of technique. Even if 
real wages go down in a recession, the decline.in the.cost ~f capital is 
even larger. The original distortion is an excessively. high pnce of labor 
relative to capital because of wage rigidities; the 1nter~st rate pol.icy 
exacerbates that distortion. We see the consequences: firms replacing 
unskilled checkout clerks and tellers with machines. 
Thus, as the economy recovers, there will be a lower demand for 
labor than there would otherwise have been- it will take a higher level 
of GDP to achieve a restoration of full employment. . . 
The problem is that we are asking too much from a smgle instru-
ment, and in principle, there are more instruments i~ the govern:nent's 
tool kit. The government could, for instance, provide a larger invest-
ment tax credit for more labor-intensive technologies. But most g~v­
ernments have eschewed using this broader set of instruments. With 
a more constrained set of instruments, monetary policy may not o.nly 
have these adverse distributional effects, but also may be less effective, 
as we shall explain shortly. 
Distributive effects of monetary policy30 
The economist's focus on aggregative models with a representative 
agent has shifted attention away from another important set of effects 
of monetary policy: their implications for the distnbut10n of mcome. 
The presumptions have been the following: (1) The focus of monetary 
policy should be macroeconomic management, and if there are dis-
tributive effects, they are likely to be minor and correctable through 
fiscal/tax and transfer policies. (2) Ensuring that the economy is at full 
employment is the most important thing that government can do to 
ensure the well-being of workers. Higher employment helps workers 
directly and indirectly: Lower unemployment will lead to higher wages 
and higher GDP will lead to higher tax revenues an.cl greater benefits for 
ordinary citizens. Recent failures of monetary policy have highlighted, 
however that there can be significant adverse distributional effects, 
and the ~olitics in the US and Europe have shown that the likelihood 
of any adverse effects on distribution being offset by government are 
146 Joseph Stiglitz 
nil. More generally, research over the past three decades has shown 
that there are significant costs of such redistributions, and unless the 
growth benefits are significant, the distributional effects may thus out-
weigh them. 31 
Among the distributional effects, two stand out: the first, its role in 
creating a jobless recovery, was discussed in the previous subsection. 
The second arises from the fact that better-off individuals dispropor-
tionately hold equities, while worse-off individuals hold debt, including 
government bonds. Lowering the interest rate on government bonds to 
stimulate the economy hurts bondholders, at the expense of those who 
own equity, thus leading to more wealth inequality.32 Indeed, elderly 
retirees who have acted prudently, in a risk-averse manner, holding 
onto government bonds, have been devastated by quantity easing. 
The distributive effects may undermine the effectiveness of mon-
etary policy. Since the marginal propensity to consume (out of income 
or wealth) of those at the top is much lower than at the bottom, any 
adverse distributive effect lowers aggregate demand. 33 Moreover, tar-
get savers (those saving for retirement, to obtain a down payment on 
a home, or to finance the education of their children) have to save 
more to meet their targets. 34 If the distributive effect is large, and the 
stimulus to investment is small (which has been the case since the 2008 
crisis, with investtnent as a share of GDP actually lower in 2015 than 
it was in 2007 in spite of QE35), then the net effect on the economy 
of lowering interest rates or more accommodative monetary policies 
(QE) may have been negative.36 
Open economy 
The previous discussion focusing on a closed economy emphasized 
that the government, having delegated the allocation of credit to the 
private sector, with limited restrictions, had relatively little control 
over the use to which money/credit would be put, and therefore there 
was at best a loose connection between monetary policy and macro-
1 
economic activity. Matters are even worse in an open economy for two 
reasons. Now, there is a further use to which the credit created can be 
put - purchasing assets abroad. This was evidenced in the aftermath of 
the 2008 crisis, where much of the liquidity created in the US went to 
purchase assets and make loans in emerging markets - not a surprise 
given the boom in these economies and the lackluster performance of 
the US. In short, the money went where it was not wanted and needed; 
and didn't go where it was wanted and needed. The stimulus of/to the 
US economy from this loose monetary policy was thus limited. 
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There is a second effect: now there is an alternative supply of credit 
from lenders outside the country. Thus, even if monetary authorities 
tighten credit there can be an offsetting effect from a flow of money 
into the coun;ry. Indeed, there has been a regular pattern of exactly this 
happening: when countries tighten credit, raising interest rates, .out of 
oncern about overheating, the higher interest rates attract an inflow 
c ff · h d . . 37 0 l of capital partially or fully o settmg t e omest1c contraction. n y 
by controlling the sources and uses of funds carefully can some sem-
blance of control over the macro-economy be achieved. 
Summing up 
Standard monetary theory has sought a neat set of instruments and 
targets by which the macro-economy could be well-regulated. There 
was perhaps as much a political drive for such parsimony as an mtel-
lectual one: if one could find a simple variable that could lead to mano-
stability, the nature of government intervention would .be very h~1ted; 
there would be little need for discretion. It was as 1f, when 1t was 
realized that Adam Smith's beautiful economic machine didn't work 
quite as perfectly as his latter-day descendants believed (though Smith 
himself was far more aware of these limitations), a slight mod1ficat1on 
to that machine would ensure its smooth running. Monetarism held 
that the government should simply expand the money supply at. a fixed 
rate. New theories focused on controlling the interest rate (and mdeed, 
some proposed a simple rule by which that might be done, reflecting 
inflation a rule that would work regardless of the source of the distur-
bance ro'the economy giving rise to the inflation). Today, these theories 
are largely discredited (see the various papers in Bl~nchard et al. 2012; 
Akerlof et al. 2014). The discussion here has provided the underlymg 
analytics explaining why we should not be surprised at the failures of 
these simple theories, and of the broader mst1tut10nal theory attnbuted 
to Tinbergen of assigning to the central bank a single target - mflauon -
and a single instrument - the short-term interest rate. 38 
Government only controls the supply of credit very indirectly 
through the instruments under its control, and it does even a poorer job 
at controlling that part of credit that goes to purchase.newly produced 
goods - say machine goods, buildings, or consumpt10n - w1thm the 
country. As a result, monetary policy is ~ weak instrument f~r control-
ling the economy in the sense that the lmk between the actions taken 
and the desired effects are uncertain. In certain circumstances, we have 
explained why it is an ineffective instrument - it simply may not be 
able to restore the economy to full employment. Its ineffectiveness goes 
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well beyond the usual "zero lower bound" argument, a generalization 
of the Keynesian liquidity trap. Indeed, seemingly more accommoda-
tive monetary policies may, under certain circumstances, even have 
perversely contractionary effects, especially when they are not well 
designed to take into account likely effects on the banking system and 
broader distributive consequences. Some evidence of this has been seen 
in recent forays into negative interest rates. 
Earlier IS-LM analysis was largely predicated on a stable demand 
curve for money. What was variable was the "real" economy: the 
interest rate at which full employment could be attained. Hence, with 
an unstable IS curve and a stable LM curve, monetary policy sought to 
increase M, the money supply, to the point where the rate of interest 
fell, to the level that induced full employment. 
It became clear, however, that the LM curve itself was unstable 
' and this naturally led the government to target the interest rate. In 
effect, M increased until the desired interest rate was achieved. It was 
assumed that lowering the (real) interest rate would lead to higher 
output. Hence, all that needed to be done was to lower the interest 
rate enough. But then, in the Great Recession, monetary authorities 
hit the ZLB. Clever economists responded that it was only the nominal 
interest rate that was constrained. If, somehow, we could raise infla-
tionary expectations, credibly committing to a higher inflation rate, 
then the real interest rate would fall, and the faith that one could rely 
on monetary policy to restore the economy to full employment would 
itself be restored. Putting aside the fact that no one has figured out 
how to make such a credible c01,nmitment, 39 we have argued that this 
framework is badly flawed. 
We have explained that the links between the instruments under the 
control of monetary authorities and the variables that affect aggregate 
activity are weak, unstable and uncertain, and even of ambiguous sign. 
For instance, lowering the T-bill rate may or may not lead to a lowering 
of the lending rate. Because of distributive effects, we have explained 
that lowering interest rates may lower aggregate demand. Even when 
there is a positive elasticity of aggregate demand to changes in interest 
rates, the interest elasticity may be small, so that the magnitude of the 
changes in interest rate required will be very large - larger than would 
be politically acceptable, because such large changes will inevitably 
have large distributive consequences.40 We have explained too that 
changes in interest rates, especially large changes, increase uncertainty; 
and such increases in uncertainty themselves can have adverse aggre-
gate effects. And this is even more so as monetary authorities stretch 
themselves, seeing that traditional instruments are failing: there is 
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uncertainty associated with these innovative instruments, eve:i. if the 
policymakers were confident about the effects, if market participants 
are not, there are adverse effects on the real economy of these risk 
perceptions. . 
We have also explained why, though monetary policy has long been 
held out as the instrument of choice, it is an instrument with some 
adverse side effects, both on efficiency and distribution. 
Indeed, it seems peculiar - and inadvisable - to attempt to correct a 
deficiency of aggregate demand arising from "shocks" to the economy 
arising, say, from an increase in uncertainty or an adverse change in 
the distribution of income of wealth (because of a deflationary shock 
which increases the real indebtedness of firms and households41 I by 
changing the interest rate (intertemporal prices). Even if one could do 
that, it seems preferable to address the underlying problem. If there is 
an increase in uncertainty, then government can take a more act1~e role 
in risk mitigation, for example, by issuing income-or state-contingent 
loans.42 If there has been a redistribution of wealth as a result of a large 
deflationary shock, the government might consider a better system .of 
debt restructuring (e.g. through a homeowners' chapter 11; see St1ghtz 
2010). 
To reflect the central refrain of my criticism of the Washington Con-
sensus,43 there are broader goals (not just price stability, but employ-
ment, growth, financial stability, and even distribution) and more 
instruments (including a broad set of regulatory tools called macro-
prudential instruments) than those seeking to employ monetary policy 
should use. Managing a complex economic system in the face of uncer-
tainty requires as many tools as one can manage; the single-minded 
focus on short-term interest rates narrowly confined what central 
banks could do, just as the single-minded focus on inflation narrowly 
confined what central banks should do. 
We have attempted to dethrone monetary policy from the pedestal 
on which it has been placed by some economists seeking to put it at 
the center of macroeconomic management. But at the same time we 
have shown how we can make monetary policy more effective than 
those who have focused on the narrow set of instruments that have 
traditionally been assigned to monetary authorities. 
The simple empirical results in the Appendix show that on average 
the link between monetary policy and variables and the real economy 
is very weak - results that are consistent with the numerous schools of 
thought (such as real business cycle theory) that have argued that the 
real economy is affected by real variables, and that monetary vanables 
have, at most, second order effects. The results of the Appendix are 
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especially powerful in discrediting standard formulations, for exam-
ple, where there is a simple Keynesian demand curve for money that 
plays a central role in interest rate determination, and this itself is at 
the center of the transmission mechanism for monetary policy. 
But even if monetary policy on average has little impact, that is not 
what monetary authorities care about: they want to know whether 
under the particular circumstances being confronted at this particula; 
moment, monetary policy can be used to stabilize the economy, to 
stimulate the economy when there is excess capacity, and to constrain 
aggregate demand when there are inflationary pressures. It should 
be clear that there have been particular moments in history when 
monetary policy has mattered. Hopefully, the analysis of this chapter 
helps us understand better when monetary policy matters, and when 
It does not. · 
In the next section of the chapter, we argue that there are more 
fundamental reforms to the monetary architecture of the economy _ 
to the system of credit and transactions - making use of 21st-century 
technology, which will enable monetary authorities in the future to do 
a far better job of macroeconomic management. 
Creating a new electronic financial system44 
The 2008 global financial crisis and the subsequent discussion of finan-
cial sector reforms highlighted the failures of financial markets and 
the enormous consequences of these failures for the economic system. 
These included the following: excessive volatility in credit creation 
with a misallocation of capital 'and a mismanagement of risk; mor~ 
credit going to the purchase of fixed assets rather than to the creation 
of productive assets; excessive and volatile cross-border flows of short-
term capital, leading to volatility in exchange rates and trade flows· 
excessive charges for the running of the payments mechanisms; and 
an array of socially unproductive practices, from market manipula-
tion to insider trading to predatory lending.45 Around the world, these 
financial market dysfunctions have had serious macroeconomic conse-
quences. In the case of Europe, misguided credit flows to the periphery 
countries created the imbalances from which Europe is still suffering. 
In the case of the US, predatory lending, securitization (often based 
on fraudulent practices), and derivatives led to the deepest downturn 
since the Great Depression. 
Modern technology provides the basis of a new and more efficient 
financial system, one that would simultaneously lead to better mac-
roeconomic regulation of the economy. The following sections briefly 
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describe the key elements of such a system - a low-cost "medium of 
exchange" for facilitating transactions and a system of credit creation 
focused on the real economy, managed in a way far more conducive to 
macroeconomic stability than the current system. 
Creating a 21st-century financial transactions system 
The banking and monetary system serves multiple purposes. One of 
them is as a medium of exchange. The world has several times made 
a change in the prevailing medium of exchange. Gold was once used 
as a medium of exchange; then, at least in the United States, there was 
a move to the bimetallic standard, where gold and silver were used. 
Finally, we moved to paper (or "fiat") money. For years, it is has been 
recognized that it would be far more efficient to move to e-money, 
away from currency. Our payments mechanism has already changed 
dramatically. We have gone a long way towards an electromc pay-
ments mechanism, and in most of the world we could go far further 
with an even more efficient one, if it were taken out of the hands of the 
monopolistic financial system. Electronic transfers are extraordinarily 
cheap but banks and credit card companies charge exorbitantly for 
, 1%El . . the service, reaping monopoly profits as a resu t. ectron1c money is 
more convenient for people on both sides of the transaction, which is 
why it has become the dominant form of payment. It saves the costs of 
printing money, which has increased as the sophistication of count~r­
feiters has increased. It has a further advantage, especially in countnes 
where small businesses predominate: it significantly curtails the extent 
of tax avoidance.47 
With electronic money, the money inside a country's banking system 
can, in effect, be easily "locked in" simply by not allowing the trans-
fer of money out of the country's banking system. But anybody can 
transfer the money in his bank account to that of anyone else. Thus, 
everybody has, in effect, almost full use of his money.48 Money inside 
the country's banking system (which for convenience, we will call the 
G-euro) would be just like any other currency, with a well-defined 
value relative to any other currency. 
Most individuals today have accounts; only the very poor are 
"unbanked", and in recent years governments and nongovernmental 
organizations, like the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, have been 
making great efforts to bank the unbanked. In most countries, govern-
ment pension payments are now transferred through bank accounts, 
partly to reduce the risk of stolen checks, and partly to reduce the out-
rageous charges that are sometimes charged by check-cashing services. 
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Thus, the task of implementing an electronic banking system today is 
clearly manageable. 
Credit: Creating a banking system that seroes society 
A big advantage of the use of fiat money was that one could regulate 
the supply. When gold was used as the medium of exchange, when 
there was a large discovery of gold - or when the gold supply increased 
as Spain conquered the New World - there would be inflation, as the 
price of gold would rise relative to other goods; if there were few 
gold discoveries, then there would be deflation. Both caused prob-
lems. Deflation, for instance, would redistribute income from debtors 
to creditors, increasing inequality and imposing hardship. America,s 
election of 1896 was fought on the issue of ihe money supply. The 
debtors wanted to increase the money supply by moving from gold to 
a bimetallic standard of gold and silver. 
While the modern financial system based on fiat money doesn't suf-
fer from the vagaries of gold discoveries, it has sometimes suffered 
from something else: volatility in the creation of money and credit 
by the banking system, giving rise to the booms and busts that have 
characterized the capitalist system. 
Banks effectively increase the supply of money by increasing the 
supply of credit. In a modern economy, central banks regulate, usually 
indirectly, banks' creation of money and credit. They are supposed to 
do. it in just the right amount, so that there is a "Goldilocks" economy, 
neither under- nor over-heated but "just right". It is apparent that 
they have often failed to do so. This is partly the result of the often-
noted "long and variable lags" associated with monetary policy- with 
monetary authorities having to base their actions on predictions con-
cerning the future course of the economy. But more importantly, for 
our purpose, is "instrument uncertainty", the weak link between what 
monetary authorities do and the impacts on GDP, since the increased 
liquidity may go for many uses other than stimulating the economy, as 
our earlier discussion emphasized. 
The traditional view of banking was based on a primitive agriculture 
economy. Farmers with excess seed - with harvests greater than they 
wanted to consume or plant the next season - could bring the seed to the 
bank, which would lend, at interest, the seed to some farmer who wanted 
more seed than he had, either for consumption (say, because he had a 
bad harvest that year) or planting. The bank had to have seed deposits in 
order to lend.49 Markets on their own equilibrated the demand and sup-
ply of seeds, so there was really little need for government intervention.50 
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But if, for some reason, there was, the interest rate provided the natural 
mechanism: if for some reason, savings (at full employment) - the sup-
ply of seeds - exceeded investment (the demand for seed), then lowering 
interest rates would cause the supply of seeds to fall and the demand for 
seeds to increase until the two were equilibrated. 
But this reasoning again totally misses the nature of credit in the 
21st century. In a modern economy, banks effectively create credit out 
of thin air, backed by general confidence in government, including its 
ability and willingness to bail out the banks, which is based in part on 
its power to tax and borrow. 51 
Targeted regulation of credit creation 
There is a problem in our current system: because the central banks' 
control mechanisms are typically very indirect, the economy is often 
over- or under-heated. Sometimes there is too much credit creation, 
leading to an excess of aggregate demand, and prices rise: there is 
inflation. Sometimes there is a lack of demand, and prices fall: there 
is deflation. 
The first part of this chapter has explained some of the key reasons 
for this failure: while central banks can regulate the supply of credit 
reasonably well, they can't (or more accurately don't) regulate the use 
to which the credit is put. Much of the credit goes to buying preexist-
ing assets, like land. Some of the credit goes to providing margin for 
bets (e.g. in futures markets). What determines whether the economy 
is over- or under-heated is the purchase of new goods and services 
(whether for consumption or investment). Thus, after the 2008 crisis, 
there was a massive increase in liquidity, as the Fed pumped money 
into the economy. But relatively little of this went to buy goods and 
services in the US, so in spite of the huge expansion of the money sup-
ply as conventionally measured, the economy remained weak. 52 
In short, even with fiat money, there may still be a deficiency of 
domestic aggregate demand - a deficiency that could be easily cor-
rected: there are individuals and firms who would like to spend but 
cannot get access to credit. A near zero interest rate does not mean 
businesses can get access to credit at such a rate - or at any rate. 
Restoring domestic control over credit creation 
The electronic payments mechanism allows a country to assert control 
over the supply of credit and the uses to which it can be put in a way 
which is far better than the current system. Think of this most directly 
.. 1 j 
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as occurring thro~gh a gover~ent bank. It can add "money" to the 
payments mechamsm by lendmg money to a small enterprise with a 
p.roven reputation that wants to make an investment. The governm 
I t " ,,. h b k ent s1mp y pu s more money Into t e an account of the enterpr1· h. h h . h se, w ic t e enterprise cant en use to pay contractors. Of course 1· 
.d. d. h ' npro-
v1 ing ere It r. ere is always a risk of non-repayment, and standards 
must be established for_ evaluating the likelihood of repayment. 
fo recent derndes, faith m government's ability to make such evalu-
ations has dim1mshed, and confidence has been placed in the pr· t f . 1 h iva e 
manc1a system. T e 2008 crisis as well as other frequent crises th t 
have marked the last third of a century have shown that that a 
f .d h b . con-1 ence as een misplaced. Not only didn't the banks make g d 
. d "d b oo JU gments - as ev1 enced Y. the massive, repeated bailouts - but they 
systematically failed to fulfill what they should have seen as th · 
major responsibility: providing credit to businesses to create new · 0 ~:r 
By .some. a~~ounts, their "real" lending amounts to just 3 perce~t 
0
£ 
their a.ct1v1t1es, by others, to some 15 percent. But by any account, 
bank fmance has been absorbed in other directions. 53 
There were always obvious problems in delegating the power of 
credit creat10.n, backed by government, to private institutions: banks 
could use the!! power to benefit their owners, through connected lend-
mg. Regulations circumscribed this, motivated by the experience of bad 
lendmg, perhaps more than by the implicit corruption and inequality 
to which such lending gives rise. 
Circumscribing connected lending didn't address one of the k 
di . bl ·· ey un er ymg pro ems: credit 1s ~carce; giving private banks the right 
to create credit with government backing gave them enormous "ec _ 
. "E . h 0 
noi:i1c rents ·. ven wit connected lending circumscribed, bankers use 
their econormc power to enrich themselves and their friends. Russi 
provides the quintessential example: those with banking licenses coul~ 
use that power to buy enormously valuable state assets, especially in 
n~tural resources. It was through the banking system that the Russian 
oligarchs were largely created. In Western countries, matters are done 
more subtly- but the net result in creating enormous inequality remains 
(though not of the magnitude of Russia). In many cases, the banks lend 
money to those whom they "trust" and judge creditworth)C with col-
lateral that they value: in short, the bankers lend money to ;hose who 
are s1m1lar to themselves. Even if banker A can't lend to himself or his 
relatives, banker A can lend to the relatives of banker B, and banker B 
can lend to the relatives of banker A. The fallibility of their judgments 
has been repeatedly demonstrated: overlending to fiber optics at one 
moment, to frack1ng at another, to housing in a third. 
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There is a second danger to the delegation of the power of credit cre-
ation to private banks. Throughout history, moneylenders have had a 
bad reputation because of the ruthlessness with which they exploit the 
poor - especially at moments of extreme need, where without money 
their family members might die. At such times, there is an enormous 
asymmetry in bargaining power, which the moneylenders exploit. Vir-
tually every religion has tried to proscribe such exploitation, prohib-
iting usury, and in some cases, even interest. Somehow, in the magic 
of Neo-liberalism, this long history was forgotten: bankers not only 
didn't suffer from the stigma of being called moneylenders, they were 
elevated to being the paragons of capitalism. In the enthusiasm over 
their new virtues, as linchpins in the workings of the capitalist system 
itself, it was simply assumed that such exploitation would not occur, 
perhaps in the belief that competition would ensure it couldn't happen, 
perhaps in the belief that with the new prosperity of workers, ordinary 
citizens wouldn't let it happen. 
All of this was wishful thinking. Freed of constraints, 21st-century 
moneylenders have shown themselves every bit as ruthless as the mon-
eylenders of the past; in fact, they are in some ways worse, because 
they have discovered new ways of exploiting both the poor and inves-
tors. 54 The financial sector has enriched itself on the back of the gov-
ernment's credibility, without performing the societal functions that 
banks were supposed to perform. In doing so, the financial sector has 
become one of the major sources of the increased inequality around 
the world. 
Even given this history, the government may want to delegate respon-
sibility for making credit decisions to private enterprises, but if so, it 
should develop strong systems of incentives and accountability, such 
that the financial system actually focuses on lending for job and enter-
prise creation and so that it does not make excessive profits as it per-
forms these functions55 and so the government should be adequately 
compensated for its backing. In effect, in the current system, all the 
"value" of the underlying government credit guarantee is captured by 
the private sector. 56 
Credit auctions 
Here, we consider one possibility for addressing this issue and provid-
ing for greater economic stability. First, the central bank (govermnent) 
auctions off the rights to issue new credit. The amounts would be 
added to the "money" that is within the financial system. The mag-
nitude of net credit that it allows to be added each month will be 
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determined by the country's central bank on the basis of its assessment 
of the macroeconomic situation - that is if the economy is weake · 
·11 · ' r, It 
w1 prov1~e more credit to stimulate the economy. The winners of the 
cre~1~ auction then allocate this "money" to borrowers on the basis of 
their Judgments about repayment capacity, within the constraints that 
the central bank may impose (described later).57 
Note that in this system, banks cannot create credit out of thin air 
and the amount of_ money being created each month is known with 
considerable prec1s1on. The winners of the credit auction can onl 
transfer money from their accounts to the borrowers' accounts. y 
Conditions would attach to selling the "rights to lend" to the banks 
Minimum percentages of the loans would go to small and medium: 
size enterprises and to new enterprises or to underserved cornmuni~ 
ties; a maximum would go to real estate lending (perhaps apportioned 
by location, based on local changes in prices), to purchases of other 
existing assets, or to those engaged in speculative activities, like hedge 
funds. None would be allocated to socially proscribed activities like 
those contributing to global warming or associated with the pr~mo­
t10n of death, such as cigarettes. In short, there would be minimum 
standards for social responsibility. There would be limits on the inter-
est rates charged. Discriminatory lending practices and other abusive 
practices by credit card companies would be proscribed. So, too, would 
connected lending. There would be further restrictions to ensure that 
the loan portfolio of the bank is safe and sound, and there would be 
strict supervision by government regulators to ensure compliance with 
the regulations governing any ~uch program. 
If it wished, the monetary authority could target credit even more 
narrnwly, to be used to purchase goods which are in excess supply, or 
which use labor of types which confront high levels of unemployment. 
There is always a trade-off: such targeted lending may be subject to 
political pressure in ways that more broad-based measures may not be. 
In a 21st-century banking system, a bank's ability to lend is, in a 
sense, given only temporarily. It is conditional on compliance with f 
the rules and standards established. The government would allow for 
entry into the banking system; indeed, separating the depository and 
lending functions and the open auction of rights to issue credit should 
make entry easier, and thus competition more vigorous than under 
current arrangements. 
Still, since lending is an information-based activity, and the gathering 
of information is a fixed cost, one would like stability in the new bank-
ing system, and this will require that banks not live on the edge - that 
is, that they be sufficiently well capitalized and sufficiently profitable. 
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"Sufficiently profitable" should not be taken to mean the 25 percent 
return on equity that one of the European banks, Deutsche Bank, 
famously came to expect as normal. Hence, entry of enterprises with 
sufficient capital and who also satisfy other conditions that enhance 
the view that they would be responsible lenders, would be encour-
aged. 58 The system of auctioning of credit would ensure that banks 
not earn excessive returns; most of the value of the public's backing to 
the creation of money/credit would be captured by the public, rather 
than as now by the bankers. At the same time, the new system of credit 
creation ensures that the social functions of finance are more likely 
fulfilled, at least better than under current arrangements. 
This is an example of how to create a 21st-century banking system, 
responding to the advantages of electronic technology, doing things 
that would have been far harder to accomplish in earlier decades - a 
banking system more likely to ensure responsible lending and macro-
economic stability than the current system, and without the huge rents 
and exploitation that have contributed so much to the inequality that 
has stalked advanced countries around the world. 
But this reform is about more than curbing bankers' exploitation. 
It is also about enhancing macroeconomic stability. One of the major 
contributors to macroeconomic instability is the instability in credit 
supply, and, in particular, to the supply of credit for the purchase of 
produced goods and services. The 2008 crisis demonstrated that all 
the advances in markets and our understanding of markets have not 
led to greater stability in this crucial variable - in fact, quite the oppo-
site. The electronic banking system described here not only enhances 
stability in this critical variable, it also provides the basis of a virtu-
ous circle leading to an increase in overall stability of the economy. 
One of the most important reasons that small businesses don't repay 
loans is macroeconomic fluctuation: loans simply can't be repaid when 
an economy is in depression. Ensuring greater macro-stability (than 
under the current regime) would do more than anything else to ensure 
the viability of the banking system and to encourage a more competi-
tive economy. 
Whence bank capital? 
The beauty of the modern credit system is that it doesn't really require 
the same kind of capital as required by banking systems of the past. 
Recapitalizing a destroyed banking system would not require gold or 
borrowing to buy seeds as it did in the old days. As we have seen, the 
government itself can simply create credit. 59 
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The fact that the money created by the government can be used to 
pay the taxes that are owed to the government, and that the govern-
ment has the power to levy taxes, ensures the value of the credit it h 
created. Indeed, because the credit that has been created is electron~~ 
money, the movement of wh1c~ .can easily be monitored, the govern-
ment does not only have the ability to levy taxes - it also enhance th 
ability to collect taxes. s e 
The only reason for bank capit~l in this world is as a partial guar-
antee that the bank has the capacity to repay the credit - the b k' 
" h "£ h an s pure ases rom t e g~vernment of the right to issue credit are only 
temporary, and the credit thus created must be repaid to the govern-
ment. (The fact that the bank will lose its own capital has, in addi-
~on,. strongb mcenhtive effects, incentivizing the bank to make good 
ec1s1ons ~ out w om to give the credit to, and to monitor the loan 
well.) But if the government is doing an adequate 1'ob of bank 
· · d h · super-
v1s1on an . as i.r:iposed appropriate regulations (e.g., on connected 
and excessively nsky lendmg), the amount of capital required w·u b 
limited. And that fa~t.alone should lead to more competition i~ th: 
market for th:=: prov1s1on of credit - reducing the excessive returns 
currently received. 
Macro-stability and income-(state-)contingent loans 
To achieve full employment may entail an auction of credit at which the 
p~1c: 1s ne.~at1ve, ;,hat is the only terms at which potential lenders are 
wilJmg to .accept the tempor~ry use of funds, to be repaid later, entail 
a negative interest rate. The auction may entail a provision (unlike the 
current system) where a negative "bank rate" has to be passed on (at 
least partialJy) to borrowers, m the form of a negative lending rate. 
Presumably there is some negative rate at which the desired credit 
creation - that viewed as necessary to ensure fuIJ employment - related 
to new spending (investment or consumption) is achieved. But it may 
be a very negative rate, and the distributive and even allocative con-
1 
sequences of that negative rate may be adverse. Accordingly, it makes 
sense to look for more effective ways of stimulating the economy. One 
such way - en~ur1ng a trade surplus - is discussed in the next section. 
Here we consider another way: state-contingent loans, whereby the 
amount the borrower has to repay depends on the state of the economy 
There is a widespread consensus that one of the reasons that con: 
~umption and investment are depressed in a deep economic downturri 
is "lack of confidence'', or, slightly more precisely, uncertainty about 
the future. Consumers are not sure of their future wages, retirees of the 
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future return on their savings, and producers of ~he returns on their 
investment. They worry that if the downturn persists, unemployment 
way be high, wages low, interest rates low, and sales poor. Traditional 
monetary policy has tried to compensate for the absence of msurance 
markets by which individuals might mitigate these risks by changmg 
the intertemporal price. It is, to say the least, a peculiar response: it 
wakes far more sense to try to address the market failure directly, than 
to increase one distortion in response to another. 60 As ':e note~ in the 
first part of the chapter, it is not even clear that lowering t~e i~ter~st 
ate is even an effective response, not just because of the d1str1but1ve 
:nd distortionary effects, but because as the interest rate is lowered, 
risk perceptions may increase, and the adverse risk effects could over-
whelm the intertemporal price effects. 
Managing the current account deficit 
The analysis so far has been for a closed economy. Extending the anal-
ysis to an open economy is at least conceptually easy. When a firm 
exports some good, say a widget, it receives dollars. The dollars could 
be kept out of the country, say in a dollar account in New York. But 
the exporter may want to bring the dollars into the country, deposit-
ing them into the country's electronic banki:'g system. The number 
of, say, G-euros that the exporter would receive m return for the dol-
lars would be market determined; that is, importers may want dollars 
to buy goods from the US. They thus transfer money in their bank 
account to the exporter. By the same token, an individual in: the coun-
try wanting to make an investment abroad, ~ay i~ the US, might want 
dollars, and be willing to transfer G-euros m his electromc bankmg 
system to someone who is willing to sell him dollars.. . . 
These capital flows may, however, be very destabihzmg - leadmg to 
large fluctuations in exports and imports as the exchange rate changes, 
leading in turn to macroeconomic instability. The central bank can 
attempt to offset these effects through the system of credit creation 
(auctions) described earlier. However, there is another way of regulat-
ing trade flows that may be more effective. 
Managing the current account deficit through trade chits 
In this proposal, the government would provide to any exporter a chit, 
a "token" (in this case, electronically recorded - alternatively called 
trade chits or Buffett chits61 ), the number in proportion to the value of 
what was exported. To import a G-euro's worth of goods, there would 
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be a requirement to pay, in addition, a G-euro's worth of chits or 
"trade tokens". There would be a free market in chits, so the demand 
and supply of chits would be equal; and by equating the demand and 
supply of chits, one would automatically balance the current account 
In practice, the value of the chit might normally be very small, a; 
least for a country with a small trade deficit. 
. This system would be a way of managing the high level of volatility 
in market economies associated with short-term capital flows. With 
the free flow of capital, the exchange rate is determined by the vaga-
nes of the market. And those capricious changes in exchange rate then 
drive exports, imports, the trade deficit, and borrowing, and in doin so~ give rise to macroeconomic instability. With the system of trading 
chits, the trad.e deficit ca':' be controlled, enhancing overall stability. ,y 
~n the previous analysis, where every import needs a chit, there is 
neither a trade surplus nor a trade balance. The government could 
use this syst.em to limit the size of the deficit or surplus as well. For 
instance, 1£ it wants to limit imports to be no more than 20 percent 
greater than exports, it can issue 1.2 import chits for every G-euro 
of exports. When there would be an excessive surplus, every import 
would be granted an "export" chit. Then every export would require 
a chit. This would automatically bring exports down to the level of 
imports. By issuing both import and export chits, the trade balance 
can be kept within any prespecified bounds. 
The fact that the country could thus stabilize the size of the trade defi-
cit or surplus has an enormous macroeconomic advantage: it facilitates 
macroeconomic stabilization it~elf. It means, for instance, that a small 
country doesn't have to suffer from the vagaries of its "external bal-
ance", its net export position. These fluctuations impose enormous costs 
on society, of which the market, in generating them, takes no account.63 
But. ensuring stability in the trade deficit also engenders longer-term 
stab1hty, for nat10nal mdebtedness, built up over many years, can sud-
denly .become unsustamable. The market sees the world through very 
myopic lenses: It :: w1llmg to lend year after year - until it suddenly , 
changes its mmd. By hm1tmg the trade deficit, a country is in effect 
limiting national borrowing; this framework thus reduces a key source 
of instability. 65 
Moreover, we can see how this system would help strengthen the 
G-euro. In the absence of the chit system, an increase in the demand 
by Greeks for imports (i.e. for, say, dollars to buy American cars) 
would lead to a fall in the price of the Greek-euro. But now, with 
imports discouraged by the necessity of also paying to purchase a chit, 
the mcreased demand for imports would be reflected in an increased 
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price of a chit, rather than a decrease in the value of the Greek-euro. 
The Greek-euro will be stronger than it otherwise would be. 
Economic theory and macro-stability 
Some might complain: aren't we interfering with the market? Of 
course, all monetary policy represents an interference with the mar-
ket: few believe that interest-rate determination should simply be left 
to the market. 
This proposal entails minimal intervention in the market, and even 
in doing so, uses market mechanisms. It corrects for a well-recognized 
externality, the market externality associated with external imbal-
ances. Markets exhibit enormous volatility in both prices and quanti-
ties: interest rates demanded of borrowers from different countries 
have moved violently in different directions, and capital and credit 
flows have fluctuated in ways that are virtually uncontrollable under 
current arrangements. 
Workers are told that they should simply accept being buffeted 
by these maelstroms that are not acts of nature but the creations of 
irrational and inefficient markets. Workers should accept wage cuts 
and the undercutting of social protections in order for the capital 
markets to enjoy their "freedom". The electronic payment system, 
with credit auctions and trade chits, is intended to bring a modi-
cum of order to this chaos, which has not even produced the higher 
growth in GDP that was promised - let alone the social benefits that 
were supposed to accompany this higher GDP. 
In the Arrow Debreu world with perfect markets, prices play a criti-
cal role in ensuring economic efficiency. But in the real world in which 
we live, as Martin Weitzman ( 197 4) explained long ago, it is often 
better not to just rely on prices, but to try, as our proposed framework 
does, to control the quantity of credit and net exports, and to regulate 
the uses to which credit is put. There is a large literature showing that 
under a variety of conditions, when there is a departure from the first-
best world, such quantity controls are a better way of regulating the 
economy. 66 However, the management of the economy in our proposed 
framework relies heavily on the use of prices, but not fully so; there is 
no micromanagement, but more macro-management than exists today. 
Conclusions 
Decades ago, we learned that one could not let a market economy 
manage itself. That is why, for instance, every country has a central 
bank determining interest rates and regulatory authorities overseeing 
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banking. Some would like to roll back the clock to a world without 
central banks and with free banking, with no restraints. Anyone who 
has read his economic history knows what a disaster that would 
likely be . 
. But anyone ~bserving macroeconomic performance in recent years 
will see that thmgs have not gone well in many countries around the 
world - even in advanced countries, in Europe and the US, with sup-
posedly well-functioning markets and institutions and well-educated 
individuals to manage the economy. The framework provided here 
provides a way of improving matters. These are modest reforms that 
would not upend the system. But they systematically address some of 
the major weaknesses of current economic arrangements, some of the 
major instabilities that have proven so costly to our economies and 
our societies. 
There are, of course, many details to be worked out. The system is 
surely not perfect. It is not intended to eliminate all speculative activ-
ity, and it will not do so. But by restraining the uses of newly issued 
credit it will curb such activities. But almost as surely, it is better than 
the current system. This framework could lead to greater economic 
stability and growth. 
Appendix67 
On the relationship between 
rnoney, output, and interest rates 
In this appendix, we present some new evidence which supports o~r 
eformulation of the theory of money and credit and macroeconomtc ~ctivity. The evidence is only suggestive, but we believe that, at the 
same time, it persuasively argues against existing formulations, even 1£ 
it provides only limited support for those advanced here. Each of the 
models we present here were widely beheved among monetary econo-
mists, some based on well-articulated theories, others advanced stmply 
as empirical regularities. The data we present for recent years under-
mines the empirical foundations for these ideas. 
Quantity theory of money 
We begin with the (now widely discredited) quantity theory of money, 
which underlay monetarism: 
(Al) MV=PQ 
where it was postulated that V, the velocity of circulation, w~s a con-
stant. In the quantity theory of money, government controls the money 
supply, so (Al) is an equation determining national income, Y, where 
(Al) Y"" PQ, 
that is, 
(A3)Y=VM, 
an hypothesis which can be directly tested, in the form of (A3 ), or in 
the form of 
(A3') In Y =In M +In V 
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or 
(A3") f'. Y = f'. M 
or 
(A3"') f'.ln Y = f'. In M. 
The quantity theory of money implies that the coefficient in the above 
regression should be unity. If we run the regression in this form, over 
the period 19S9-2016, using quarterly data, for instance, the coeffi-
cient is significantly different from 1. 68 
We can test the model in other ways, for instance, by running the 
regression 
(A4) f'.Y =a+~ f'. M. 
The hypothesis (A3") predicts that 0 = 1 and a= 0. We can reject both 
hypotheses, and the fit of the regression is remarkably poor. 69 
We have run the tests against all the specifications, with flexible lags, 
usmg the standard defm1t10n of money, M2, and with alternative time 
periods. We have also run the regressions in logarithmic form, a more 
natural specification in order to remove scale effects: 
(A4') f'.ln Y = a+ ~ f'. In M 
The fit worsens, but the conclusion is unaltered.7° 
Often, it makes more sense to express -everything in real terms: 
(AS) f'.Q = a+ ~ f'. MIP 
or 
(AS') f'.ln Q =a+~ f'. ln M/P 
Again, if the quantity theory were true, a should be zero and ~ unity. ' 
Two striking things stand out from our regressions, done over the 
period 19S9 to 201671 (and various subsets of that period) with US 
data (preliminary work suggests similar results for other countries): 
(1) 0 is always small, and sometimes even insignificant; and (2) the 
relationship between a change in Q (or Y) and changes in M/P (or M) 
has weakened, with a structural break sometime around 1990.n That 
there should be some structural break is hardly a surprise, for there 
were marked changes in both the financial sector (both in regulations 
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and the creation of new instruments, which serve as effect substitutes 
to money, the money market funds) and in the conduct of mon.etary 
policy (the switch from a focus.on the money supply itself to the mter-
est rate, with a greater emphasis on inflation). 
It is possible, of course, that our measure of money is "wrong". 
:Moreover, M2 clearly has some element of endogeneity, with banks 
lending more, creating more money, when income is going up (or is 
expected to be going up.) Accordingly, we reran our regressions.wit.h 
another notion, base money - the balance sheet of the Fed - which is 
seemingly a variable more directly under control of monetary authori-
ties than M2. Let B be the size of the Fed's balance sheet (which we 
take as a crude measure of "base money"). Then the true money sup-
ply (here assumed unobservable) is assumed to be a function of B 
(observable). We again run these regressions, replacing B (or f'.B) for 
:M (or f'.M). The results are similar: either no significant effect, or a 
small effect. 73 •74 
The demand for money 
These are all models suggesting that somehow money "drives" the 
economy. But there is an alternative way of writing all of these 
equations, more modestly, as simply a demand curve for money. 
The quantity theory can be thought of as being an equilibrium 
model based on a special case of the Keynesian demand equatwn 
for money 
(A7) M' = k(r) PQ, 
where the demand for money is made proportional to income, with the 
proportionality factor depending on the interest rate. 
Constant velocity 
If k' = 0 then V = 1/k. If we also assume that we are always (nearly) 
on the d~mand curve of money (after all, no one forces people to hold 
money that they don't want to hold), then 
(A8) M=kY, 
with the correlates f'.M = kl'. Y, etc. As we shall comment further, test-
ing (AS) simply tests whether the economy is "on" a demand function 
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of the given form, a seemingly much weaker hypothesis than that l'v[ 
"'drives" the economy. We can test it by running the regression 
(A8') L'>M =a'+ 6' L'> Y, 
or, perhaps better (eliminating scale effects) 
(A8") L'>ln M =a'+ 6' L'; ln Y, 
with the quantity theory hypothesis being 6' = 1 and a' = 0. 
Our empirical analysis provides convincing evidence rejecting the 
hypothesis of the quantity theory of money and the related demand the-
ory for money.75 There are several alternative explanations. The analysis 
of this chapter has provided one explanation: money is not needed for 
transactio~s, and most transactions are not directly related to income (Y) 
(and there 1s no reason that they wonld grow in proportion to Y). There 
are some difficult econometric problems, which might lead to coefficient 
bias - but are hardly likely to provide a convincing explanation of the 
results. 76 The most obvious explanation is that Vis not constant. 
Keynesian demand for money 
Keynesian monetary theory hypothesized a stable demand function for 
money, where a linearized version of (A7) gives a corresponding set of 
equations, such as 
(A9) L'>ln M = a' + 6' ln L'; Y + 'Y' L'; r 
or 
(AlO) L'> ln M/P =a'+ 6' ln L'>Q +'Y' L'; r 
Testing (A9) is testing whether the economy is on a Keynesian demand 
function. There are, of course, important econometric problems in test-
ing any of these relations, since all of the variables are, in some sense, 
endogenous. This is true even when government sets Mand/or r, because 
it sets these variables based on expectations of Y, or what Y would be 
in the absence of intervention, and those expectations may well be cor-
related with Y or Q itself. We shall return to these problems later. 
Here, we simply note that in running the regression, a.' should be 
zero (a value of a' not equal to zero would suggest that there are econ-
omies or diseconomies of scale in the use of money. While inventory 
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theories of money might suggest that there are economies of scale, the 
presumption has been that these are sufficiently small that a' would 
not deviate significantly from zero), S' should be unity, and 'Y' should 
be negative (r here should be the opportunity cost of holding money). 
The first two hypotheses can clearly be rejected, and the overall fit is 
sufficiently poor that it suggests we are not on the Keynesian demand 
function for money. 'Y', while of the right sign, is very small.77•78 These 
results should create skepticism about the edifice created on the foun-
dations of Keynesian monetary theory. 
Keynesian equilibrium 
The standard Keynesian model assumes a stable demand curve for 
money, while the demand for investment and consumption is somewhat 
volatile. Investment is a function of the (real) rate of interest. The IS-LM 
curves give the resulting equilibrium, assuming that inflationary expec-
tations are fixed, so that a change in r translates into a change in R, the 
real interest rate. The same results hold if, as in more recent models, one 
assumes consumption is a function of the interest rate.79 Thus, we write 
(Al la) r = <p (Y/M), 
from the LM curve, and insert this into the stochastic IS curve 
(Allb) Y = ~ (r) = ~(<p(Y/M)) + E, 
which we rewrite in linearized form80 
(Allb) Y =a'+ WM+ E 
or, 
(Al le) L'; ln Y = a' + i3' L'> ln M + e:. 
In the standard Keynesian model, price is fixed (in the short run), so 
the more interesting variant predicts that an increase in the money sup-
ply increases real income.81 
(Alld) L'; ln Q =a'+ 6' L'> ln M + E 
(Allc) and (Alld) are, of course, just the "reverse" equation of 
(AS). and the same as (A4) and (AS), respectively, except now our 
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hypothesis is only that W > 0: An increase in the money supply leads 
to a ~ower1ng of the interest rate, and this should increase nominal and 
real income .. But our nalve regressions show that an increase in mone 
lowers real mcome (13'_ is negative, though not siguificantly differe:i 
from. z.ero), though it increases nominal income - with a significant 
coeffrcrent. It would seem, on the basis of this crude analysis that 'f 
. ff ' I m?netary expansro~ a. ects national income, it is more by affecting the 
pnce level, contradrctmg the underlying assumption of the Keynes' 
odlth . f' dTh ran ~ e at pr1~es are .1xe . ere are, of course, important simultane-
ity .problems; in particular, monetary policy is conditional on many 
vanables that could themselves be correlated with f; Y. We will say a 
httle more about this later. 
Government controls r 
As th.e instability of the LM curve became clear, as we noted in the 
text, It .made sense for monetary authorities to switch to a focus on 
the vanable that they (wrongly) believed to be the key determinant 
of macroeconomic activity, the interest rate. They could control at l~ast the nominal interest rate directly, and if inflationary expecta-
t10ns. were fixed, they could thus control the real interest rate. If 
rnflat10nary expectations were variable and highly unpredictable 
of course, controlling the nominal interest rate would leave much 
o! the r.eal interest rate out of the control of monetary authorities. 
Since different economic actors may respond to different interest 
~ates and associated variables affecting the cost of capital, it is not 
just the T-bill rate that matters. Indeed, the thrust of the first part 
of the chapter was to argue that the most important variable affect-
mg. mves.tment (at least by SMEs) is the lending rate, and that this 
varrnble rs only loosely connected with the T-bill rate. Tobin argued 
that rt was the pnce of equity, and this may even be more loosely 
related to the T-bill rate. Some investments may be more related to 
the long rate than the short, and the maturity structure itself is an 
endogenous variable - at least it was before monetary authorities 
sought to affect it through QE. 
We ignore these complexities, postulating that 
(Alld) nQ =a+ 'Ynr, 
or in logarithmic form 
(Al le) L; In Q =a+ 'Ynr, 
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where it is assumed that the government controls r (possibly through 
the control of M). We run reduced form regressions of the form (Al ld) 
and (Alle), obtaining a coefficient on nr of the wrong sign, with again 
there being a structural break in the late 80s/early 90s, perhaps cor-
responding to the adoption of the interest rate as the focal point of 
monetary policy. 82 The logarithmic form does slightly better, but in 
both, the R2 is very low. There are many things driving the econ-
omy. Changes in interest rates do not appear to be among the more 
important. 
In the formulations so far, renters through the money demand equa-
tion, representing the opportunity cost of holding funds. But standard 
Neo-classical theory suggests that investment and consumption are 
affected not by the nominal interest rate, but by the real interest rate, 
R. Changes in nominal interest rates translate into changes in real 
interest rates if inflationary expectations are constant. But inflationary 
expectations may well change as r or Q changes. Most simply, assume 
L;R = f(L;Q, nr) and l;Q = H(nR). We thus obtain in reduced lin-
earized form (Al ld) once again. Only the interpretation of the coef-
ficients has changed. 
More agnostically, we regress changes in output and the log of out-
put against both changes in nominal and real interest rates, using the 
interest rate derived from treasury inflation-indexed security, constant 
maturity, as a proxy for the real interest rate 
(A12a) L;Q =a+ 'Yf;r + d f;R, 
(A12b) nln Q =a+ 'Ynr + d nR. 
Several things stand out from these regressions, done over the shorter 
period 2003-2016 (largely because of data availability) using quar-
terly data. The R2 is much higher than in any of the other equations. 
Most significantly, only the coefficient on the nominal interest rate is 
significant. By the same token, if we run the regression on only nomi-
nal or real interest rate, nominal does better than real - the real is not 
significantly different from zero. 83 
We have run regressions with variable lags, and the results remain 
unchanged. 
To be sure, we have not estimated a sophisticated structural model, 
nor have we massaged the data or engaged in any of the usual data 
mining. (There are, accordingly, reasons that our estimates may be 
downward biased.) All that the analysis says - and it may be saying a 
lot - is that a quick and dirty look at the data doesn't provide the kind 
of support for many of the maintained hypotheses in conventional 
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monetary theory and m~croeconomics. 84 In particular, most striking 
are the results on money itself - for the standard hypothesis is that th 
money demand equation is relatively stable; that the money dem de 
' 'fh 1 an equation 1s o t e genera postulated form; and equilibrium anal · 
"thh b""h ys1s requires at t e economy e on t e money demand equation Th 
data rejects those hypotheses. · e 
An alternative interpretation? 
There are other, more complicated interpretations of the results 
(A12) (or the earlier simpler versions). If monetary authorities won 
f · d" · h ere per ect m pre 1ctmg w at output would be in the absence of cha 
. . nges 
tn monetary policy, and thus changed monetary policy perfectly, to 
ensure that the economy was always at full employment, there would 
be no correlat10n between real output and monetary policy variabl 
Of course, we_ know that monetary authorities have been far from p~;: 
feet m predICtmg what output would have been in the absence of th · 
· · d f f f eir 1ntervent1on, an ar rom per ect in designing intervention to ens 
h . bl ure t at output is sta e. 
Assume that monetary authorities raise interest rates when the 
. . d b y expect outp~t to increase next per10 a ave trend, and dampen output 
from what tt would have been but not relative to the long-run trend. 
Then penods .of high mterest rates would be periods of high growth. 
Monetary policy may have worked- but the regressions don't show it. 
Fortunately, we have data that expresses the forecasts of the Fed itself 
and of the general market consensus. Unfortunately, such forecasts 
embed both forecasts of the unC!erlying disturbances to the economy 
and the. Fed response, and the fact that such forecasts show system-
atic deviations from full employment implies that forecasters do not 
believe that the Fed will fully correct any "shock" to the underlying 
system. On average, one does not believe that Fed policy deliberately 
moves the economy away from full employment. Thus, it is reason-
able to assume that when forecasters see a larger deviation from full 
employment, they see an adverse shock that will be partially, but not 
fully, offset by the Fed (consistent with risk aversion combined with 
instrument uncertainty; see Greenwald and Stiglitz 1989). 
We have data on market forecasts of both interest rates (predictions 
of Fed po hey) and output, and thus can ascertain whether there is any 
systematic effect on outcomes relatives to forecasts of the Fed's doing 
something different from what was expected. There does not appear 
to be. Lest we view what forecasters say about their forecasted inter-
est rate not as reflecting their "true" forecasts, we modeled a forecast 
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of the Fed's policy based on their expectations of output (or other 
variables), and ascertained whether deviations of policies from these 
predicted policies had an effect on output. It did not seem to. 
The theoretical analysis of this chapter has provided a set of expla-
nations for why none of these results should come as a surprise. They 
are not "econometric artifacts", likely to disappear if we massage the 
data enough, but rather should be taken to be stylized facts which 
economic theories need to take account of. 
Nor should the fact that our results show no systematic relation-
ship between money and output be taken to mean that money doesn't 
matter. Our models explain why it matters, both in normal and abnor-
mal times. In abnormal situations - such as Volker's sudden change in 
US monetary policy - the credit constraints and soaring interest rates 
mattered hugely - they threw the US economy into a recession. Our 
analysis explains why one shouldn't look just to the interest rate -
and especially to the T-bill rate - to assess the consequences. In more 
normal times, our analysis explains why other variables, like changes 
in expectations and perceptions of risk are likely to be as or more 
important; and again, the effects of monetary policy may be felt more 
through credit availability than through small changes in interest rates; 
and changes in credit availability may be far from perfectly correlated 
with changes in money supply. Thus, while this chapter takes a some-
what nihilistic stand on some of the monetary econometrics, it is quite 
positive about the relevance of monetary policy- though it argues that 
its effects cannot be well-captured in a single variable, like M2 or "r". 
Notes 
1 All data in this chapter was obtained from the Federal Reserve Economic 
Data base (FRED), available at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/. 
2 This section represents a development of ideas earlier presented in Green-
wald and Stiglitz (2003 ). 
3 In the 2008 :financial crisis this relationship broke down temporarily. 
Apart from that, there appears to be no significant cyclical movement in 
the difference between the T-bill rate and the money market rate. 
4 See Robertson (1934) and Ohlin (1937). 
5 That is, the spread between the two is endogenous, and can vary with 
economic conditions and policy. 
6 More broadly, with imperfect information, behavior is constrained by col-
lateral, self-selection and incentive compatibility constraints. 
7 Effects which may arise from the change in policy (interest rates) itself -
some of which we describe in greater detail later - or which may arise 
simultaneously from other sources. 
8 As we have already noted, as influential as Keynes's work has been, it 
provides a poor description of a modern credit-based economy. (In the 
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Appendi~, for ~ns~ai:ice, \.Ve provide convincing evidence against the 
hypothesis that rnd1v1duals are on a stable demand function of the kind 
hypothesized by Keynes.) But while Robertson's focus on the demand 
and supply of funds is m~re convincing, his analysis is flawed, partly 
?ecause he .f~1led to rec?gn1ze the central role of asymmetric information 
in the prov1s1on of credit, partly because he failed to take adequately into 
acco.unt the role of banks in the provision of credit (the subject of the dis~ 
cuss1on here). In the standard loanable funds theory (without banks) the 
role of government was limited: It was individual farmers who decide how 
much seed to supply and demand. Our theory, by contrast, says even here 
there can be a role through the rules government sets for the functioning 
of the critical intermediary institutions. 
9 It leaves out, for instance, the role of rating agencies, investment analysts, 
etc. That these markets often do not work well is an understatement evi-
denced by the problems in the financial crisis of 2008 and the scand~ls of 
the early 2000s. See Stiglitz (2003, 2010). . 
10 Moreover, ultimately, the supply of funds to large enterprises depends on 
the funds made available to a variety of intermediaries, which in turn 
depends on the credit creation mechanisms described here. 
11 There are other reasons that firms {including banks) may act in a risk-
averse m.anner. Imperfect information means that there is a separation of 
owi:iership and control (Berle and Means 1932; Stiglitz 1985) and firms 
tfpically construct incentive arrangements that lead managers to act in a 
risk-averse manner {Greenwald and Stiglitz 1990). 
12 Their .analysis also assumes that the risks confronting banks (and other 
firms rn the economy) can neither be insured nor distributed across the 
economy, for example, because of information asymmetries. 
13 I~ their model, bank assets are not fully tradable, because of informa-
tion asymmetries. Accordingly, if the perceived risk associated with certain 
assets the bank holds increases, its willingness to undertake more risks 
may be adversely affected. 
14 Their models also explain amplification: Why a seemingly small shock can 
have large effects. 
15 The inability to divest oneself of risk generates an important hysteresis 
effect. Government regulatory policy may exacerbate these problems: 
When there are, for instance, capital adequacy requirements and banks' 
net worth is not evaluated on a mark-to-market basis, then a sale results in 
the re.cognition of a loss which is otherwise "hidden". On the other hand, 
marking to .market forces banks to contract lending (or raise new equity) 
whe~ there is~ {what the bankers believe is a) temporary change in market 1 
~entrment against the assets which they hold. Of course, the irony is that 
in other contexts, bankers, as a group, have been the strongest advocates 
of the "market" and its rationality. But as the 2008 crisis demonstrated, 
thezr have s~o.wn an impressive level of cognitive dissonance - arguing 
against subsidies for others (such subsidies would distort markets) but for 
themselves (without state aid, the whole economy was at risk). See Stiglitz 
(2010). 
16 As we h.ave noted, risk perceptions relate not just to macroeconomic risks, 
but to risks of particular individuals, firms, and institutions, which in turn 
have macroeconomic consequences. Thus, it does not suffice to know that 
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the value of say eq~ity has ~ecreased somewhere in the economic system. 
A bank contemplating making a loan to a particular firm wants to know 
the economic situation of that particular firm. Uncertainties surrounding 
that are affected both by rules governing transparency and the structure of 
the economy - the nature of the interlinkages among firms. 
We need to distinguish too between structural breaks - the move from 
agriculture to industry or from industry to services - with shocks to the 
system that, though large, do not fundamentally alter the structure of the 
economy. Thus, while Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993a, 1993b, 2003; as 
well as the large number of papers leading up to those studies and cited 
there) provided the intellectual foundations for what has since come to 
be called balance sheet recessions, they have argued that the current eco-
nomic ~ownturn is not fully described as a balance sheet recession, but 
rather is best seen as part of a deep structural transformation. See Del-
liGatti et al. (2012, 2016). 
17 For a review of the arguments, see Greenwald and Stiglitz (2003). 
18 I should emphasize that the significant bank contraction in lending to 
SMEs is not just a response to conventions, rules, and regulations. In 2008 
there was a significant increase in risk perceptions, and such changes have 
a particularly large adverse effect on undercapitalized firms, among which 
SMEs are heavily represented. 
19 This discussion illustrates a more general principle: In markets with asym-
metric information, there are marked discrepancies between private and 
social returns. This can be especially so in the presence of rationing. See 
Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986). 
20 This has been a long standing criticism of Friedman's criticism of mon-
etary policy in the Great Depression. The fall in the money supply does 
not necessarily mean that the Fed caused the depression through its con-
tractionary policy. The fall in money holding could be the result of the 
reduction in (anticipated) economic activity. And the Fed may have been 
powerless to overcome the exogenous perturbations giving rise to the 
decline in GDP. Indeed, while it may not have been able to fully offset the 
underlying forces, it may still have had an unambiguously positive effect: 
The decline in GDP could have been smaller than it otherwise would have 
been. See, for example, Tobin (1970). 
21 Not surprisingly, there has been enormous controversy over whether the 
negative interest rates have had a positive or negative effect. Japan's cen-
tral bank governor Kuroda tried to design the negative interest rate pro-
gram in ways which limited the balance sheet effect, while retaining the 
intertemporal substitution effect. Whether he fully succeeded is part of the 
debate. 
22 See Stiglitz (2015d, 2016b, 2016c) and Turner (2015). Stiglitz (2015b) 
provides a theoretical model linking monetary policy to land values. 
23 See Guzman and Stiglitz (2015, 2016). 
24 As the regressions reported in the Appendix amply illustrate. 
25 Again, as evidenced in the regressions described in the Appendix. 
26 This effect has been stressed by Jonathan Kreamer in his Ph.D. thesis 
(Kreamer 2015). 
2 7 There may be a loss of intertemporal welfare from the variability in fis-
cal expenditures. But if the variability takes the form of infrastructure 
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investments, and if the investment authority (say an investment bank I'k 
the EIB) were to keep an inventory of good, high return projects then' tlhe 
fl f " · "f h k f ' e ow o services rom t e aggregate stoc o public capital would 
be hig~ly variabl~. If the inputs used in P.ublic inf~astructure investm~~~ 
~ere highly subst_1tutable with thos.e u.s~d ii: say private construction, and 
if one of the main sources of var1ab1hty in aggregate output is priv t 
construction, then the social costs of putting the burden of adjustment~ e 
public infrastructure investment may be relatively low. n 
28 Of course, debt :financed g~vernment spending may lead to an offsettin 
effect through the expectation of future taxes, but the conditions undeg 
which the adverse consequences of this is fully offsetting are highly restric~ 
tive. See Stiglitz (1988) 
29 Th.at is, Ramsey. showe~ that optimal taxation entailed distorting all prices 
a little from the~r TI?arginal costs, rather tha~ a single price a lot. Modern 
monetary practice rs based on the hypothesis that government interven-
tion should be limited to interventions only in the short-term interest rate 
!here is,. to ~y ki:iowledge, no general proof that it is optimal to limi; 
interventions in this way. 
30 For a more extensive discussion of the issues raised here, see Stiglitz 
(2015a). Even the Fed has begun to recognize the potential importance of 
these effects. See Yellen (2014). 
31 These are associated with the "repeal" of the second fundamental theorem 
of welfare economics, implying that issues of distribution and efficiency 
cannot be separated, as suggested by earlier analyses. See, for example 
Stiglitz (1994, 2002a). ' 
32 See Stiglitz (2015a, 2015c). We should expect such differentials in wealth 
holdings: Life cycle savers have to be more prudent in their wealth manage-
ment than wealthy "capitalists". Giovannoni (2014, 2015) provides evidence. 
33 See Stiglitz (2015d) and the references cited there. 
34 This may be especially so if individuals are saving to purchase a home 
since the lower interest rate rµay itself give rise to higher house prices' 
meaning that the down payment required is also larger. ' 
35 In 2007, gross domestic investment for the US was 22 percent of GDP and 
fell to 20 percent by 2015. ' 
36 C?f course, these n~mbers do not answer the relevant hypothetical ques-
tion: What would investment have been but for the lowering of interest 
rates? Still, the fact that lowering interest rates from 5 to O percent has 
had such small an effect suggests that lowering the interest rate from O to 
minus 2 percent is unlikely to have a large effect. 
37 See Stiglitz (2002b, 2015c) and Guzman and Stiglitz (2013) for a discus- 1 
sion ~f t~ese issues and the consequent importance of monetary policy 
coord1nat1on. 
38 See, for example, Stiglitz (1998b, 2014). 
39 Much of the argument for an independent central bank is based on enhanc-
ing the ability to make such a commitment. If bankers control the central 
bank, because they benefit from a low inflation rate, it is more credible 
that the central bank will act in ways which limit inflation. But the crisis 
of 2008 showed the flip side risks: A central bank captured by the finan~ 
cial sector will do an inadequate job at financial regulation, exposing the 
economy to the far greater risks associated with financial instability. 
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40 Moreover, such large changes give rise to high levels of uncertainty, with 
strong adverse effects. 
41 The shock does not actually have to be deflationary: All that is required is 
that the rate of inflation be less than was expected. 
42 Australia has provided income contingent loans for a long time. The US 
has begun doing so in the case of certain student loans. Stiglitz (2014) 
and Stiglitz and Yun (2013, 2014, 2016) have proposed doing so for 
unemployment loans, and Chapman et al. (2014) present a range of other 
examples of such loans. 
43 See Stiglitz (1998a, 2016d). 
44 This section is adapted from Stiglitz (2016e). 
45 Regulators, legislatures, and courts in antitrust actions have finally begun 
intervening to curtail the high fees and abusive practices, but the fees 
remain far higher than what they should be. 
46 Regulators, legislatures, and courts in antitrust actions have finally begun 
intervening to curtail the high fees and abusive practices, but the fees 
remain far higher than what they should be. 
4 7 Cyber security is one of the key problems faced in modern electronic pay-
ments mechanisms. The advantages of electronic transactions are, none-
theless, overwhelming, which is why even with monopoly pricing, there 
has been a shift toward this system. 
48 The major exception, for the purchase of goods and services from abroad, 
is discussed later. 
49 The evolution of the banking system from the primitive corn economy 
toward its modern form is interesting and informative. Early banks were 
really based more on gold deposits than on corn deposits. Those with 
more gold than they wanted to spend put it in the bank, and the bank lent 
it out to others. Soon, banks discovered that they could create pieces of 
paper, claims on gold, that others would accept, and that they could pro-
duce more of such pieces of paper than they had gold, in the knowledge 
that not all holders of these pieces of paper would ask for their money 
simultaneously. As it gave gold to some who asked for it, it would receive 
gold from others. 
Occasionally, there would be a panic when holders of these pieces of 
paper worried whether the bank could fulfill its promises, and, of course, 
when they panicked and all went to the bank to demand their gold, there 
was not enough to satisfy their demands. The banks would go bankrupt, 
and the economy could be thrown into a depression. 
Deposit insurance was invented to prevent these panics: The govern-
ment explicitly stood behind the banks' promises. This gave greater faith 
that the promises would be honored (so long as there was faith in the 
government), and this in turn reduced the likelihood of a panic. But if 
the government was to provide these guarantees, this insurance, it had to 
make sure that the bank was acting responsibly - for example, lending out 
money to people who could actually pay it back, and not lending to the 
owners of the bank and their friends. Gerry Caprio, with whom I worked 
at the World Bank and who studied government rescues around the world, 
was fond of saying that there are two kinds of countries - those who have 
deposit insurance and know it, and those who have deposit insurance and 
don't know it. Sweden, before its financial crisis in the 1990s, had no 
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deposit insurance, but it rescued its banks nonetheless. In the 2008 crisis 
suddenly deposit insurance was extended to accounts that had not bee~ 
fully insured before. 
One can understand government taking on this new role, partially as 
a result of the magnitude and frequency of the panics and downturns in 
the market economy in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Moreover, as 
advanced countries, like the US, transformed themselves from agricultural 
economies to industrial economies, with an increasing fraction of the pop-
ulation dependent on manufacturing and other nonagricultural jobs, these 
economic fluctuations took a toll. So long as ordinary citizens had little 
voice in what government did, so what if so many suffered so much? But 
with the extension of the franchise and increasing democratic engagemen't, 
it became increasingly difficult for government to ignore these mega-fail-
ures of the market. 
50 The theory of credit rationing based on information asymmetries provided 
an explanation for why markets on their own m,ight fail. 
S1 See J.E. Stiglitz (201Sc) and Greenwald and Stiglitz (2003). 
52 There are several other "slips between the cup and the lips" discussed 
more fully in Part I of this chapter. 
S3 See, for example, Kay (201S) and Turner (201S). 
54 More broadly, it has been shown that much of the increase in inequality 
in the advanced countries in recent decades is related to finance. See, in 
particular, Galbraith (2012) and Stiglitz (2012). 
SS See Akerlof and Shiller (201S). 
5 6 This is especially so through the privatization of gains and the socializa-
tion of losses that has become a regular feature in economies with too-big-
to-fail banks (see Stiglitz 2010). 
57 The system is symmetric. The central bank may decide that there is too 
much money in the economic system that is, the banks are lending too 
much, using "money" that they receive in repayment. In that case, the gov-
ernment can buy back rights to is~ue credit: They buy back the money that 
they have allowed the banks to effectively manage on their behalf. Again, 
there can be an open auction for those most willing to give up rights to 
issue credit. This would literally drain money out of the banking system. 
5 8 Entry would presumably occur to the point where the before-tax return to 
capital (measured over the business cycle) would be slightly more than the 
normal return to capital. Some excess return may be necessary to induce 
more responsible social behavior on the part of bankers. 
59 Either through a government bank or through the auction mechanism just 
described. 
60 It should be clear that the generalized Ricardian equivalence theorem 
(which holds that government financial risk has no effect; Stiglitz 1988) 
does not hold and that there are real benefits to this socialization of risk. 
In particular, the firms and consumers who are effectively "buying" this 
state insurance are engaging in bets which increases their expected wealth, 
so that there is a pseudo-wealth effect; there is also a "substitution" effect. 
Both increase investment, consumption, and production. 
61 See Buffet (2003). 
62 To prevent the buildup of chits - speculators might buy them on the bet 
that a chit is more valuable some years into the future - the chits should 
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be date-stamped; they would have to be used, for example, within a period 
of one year. (It's possible that some international rules, such as those cur-
rently stipulated by the WTO, would need to be changed to accomr:1o-
date the system of chits, which could be viewed as a system of multiple 
exchange rates.) . 
63 These are an example of macroeconomic externalities, such. as d1scu~sed 
by Anton Korinek, themselves a generali.za~ion of the pervasive p~cun1ary 
externalities to which Greenwald and Stightz (1986) called attention. 
64 See Calvo (1998) for a discussion of sudden stops. 
65 The experience of Europe an~ else~here h~s shown th.at it is not so. much 
government borrowing that gives nse to cnses, but national b.orrow1ng. In 
some cases the national borrowing was government borrowing (Greece), 
but in ma~y other cases (Ireland and Spain) it was private borrowing. 
When a crisis hits, the debt quickly moves from the private balance sheet 
to the public's. 
66 See also Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1977). 
67 All the data is from the Federal Reserve Economic Database ("FRED") at 
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Contact the author for information 
on the exact time series used. 
68 The 9S percent confidence interval is [0.7287, 08811] 
69 ex= S7.946S, 9S%CI = [4S.7192, 70.1738]; G = 0.3692, 9S%CI = 
[0.2148, O.S237], R2 = 0.089S. 
70 o. = 0.0119, 9S%CI = [0.0091, 0.0146]; p = 0.2287, 9S%CI = [0.0796, 
0.3777], R2 = 0.0389. 
71 In the case of (AS): o. = 62.SS33, 9S%CI = [S2.1117, 72.9949]; 3 = -
0.2022, 9S%CI = [-0.4990, 0.094S]; R2 = 0.081. In the case of (AS'): Ol = 
0.0069, 9S%CI = [O.OOS6, 0.0082]; p = 0.0897, 9S%CI = [-0.0094, 
0.1887]; R2 = 0.0141. 
72 To identify the structural break, we used the sup Chow test .(Andr~~s 
2003); the tests show that in general there is a lot of parameter instability 
in the two decades between 1975 and 1995. 
73 The only regression in which the coefficient on the assets variable is 
(barely) significant is a contemporaneous regression of l~g real ?utput on 
log real assets - even there it is a meager 0.068 .. Regressions w1t.h lags or 
leads eliminate significance. Interestingly, there is very strong evidence of 
a structural break exactly in 2008 in this model. . . 
74 If Pis constant, as in Keynesian theories, then the afore~ent1oned equations 
give a simple relationship between real output (Q) and norrunal M, for examplei 
(A6) !'. Q = o. + p !'. M or 
(A6') !'.In Q = ex+ Cl!'. In M. 
7S For (AS'): o. = 34.7090, 9S%CI = [23.973S, 4S.4444]; 3 = 0.2423, 
9S%CI = [0.1410, 0.3436]; R2 = 0.0895. For (AS"): ex = 0.0139, 
9S%CI = [0.0118, 0.01S9]; p = 0.1700, 9S%CI = [O.OS92, 0.2808]; 
R2 = 0.0389. The R2 is tiny. It is clear that these do not provide (without 
further massaging) a good description of money demand holdings. 
76 See also the later discussion. 
77 (A9): o.'= 0.0127, 9S%CI = [0.0106, 0.0148]; W = 0.2439, 9S% CI = 
[0.1294, 0.3S84]; ·y• = -0.0023, 9S%CI = -0.003S, -0.0011]; R2 = 0.09S4. 
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(AlO), a' = 0.0052, 95%CI = [0.0033, 0.0071]; W = 0.2768, 95%CI = 
[0.1015, 0.4521]; 'Y' = -0.0037, 95%CI = [-0.0053, -0.0020]; R2 = 0.0924 
78 As we have emphasized repeatedly in this Appendix, we have not engaged 
in extensive data mining. Our objective is simply to suggest that that it is 
hard to reconcile observed data with the standard hypotheses. Of course 
as we argue in the text, the observed money supply may depend on man; 
other variables than income and the interest rate, and controlling for those 
variables, one should obtain a better fit. 
Since the costs of adjusting money balances are small, it might be argued 
that there is little reason that individuals are not on their money demand 
curve. Still, one can view money balances as a residual, and if individuals 
cannot adjust other elements of their spending, then money balances wilI 
be off the demand curve in the event of an income (or interest rate) shock. 
We have estimated the demand function for money, assuming flexible lags, 
and the Keynesian monetary equation is still rejected. 
79 The analysis becomes only slightly more complicated if inflationary expec-
tations depend on the level of output in equilibrium. 
80 If inflationary expectations (ie) are a function of the gap between actual 
and potential output, with potential output fixed for the moment, then 
ie = H(Y). Writing the IS curve as Y = Z(R) = Z(r-i') = Z (r- H(Y)), or Y = Z'(r) 
81 Aggregate demand is a function of the real interest rate, and the IS curve 
only determines the nominal interest rate (the opportunity cost of hold-
ing money). But if expectations about prices or price changes are fixed, a 
change in nominal interest rates translates directly into a change in real 
interest rates. A more general case is discussed later. 
Figure 7.3 and an associated regression undermine the credibility of the 
determination of the (nominal or real) interest rate through a Keyesian 
LM framework. 
82 Alldo a = 59.5758, 95%CI = [51.0058, 68.1457]; "Y' = 20.4850, 
95%CI = [11.0189, 29.9511]; R2 = 0.0745. Alk a= 0.0075, 95%CI = 
[0.0065, 0.0086]; 'Y = 0.0029, 95%CI = [0.0018, 0.0041], R2 = 0.1008. 
In these regressions, the "effective federal funds rate" is used as a proxy 
for the nominal interest rate. 
83 Moreover, the coefficient on the nominal interest rate is of the wrong sign, 
that is an increase in the nominal interest rate is associated with a higher 
Y, for a given real interest rate. In fact, this is not as surprising as it seems. 
Since the nominal interest rate is the real interest rate plus the rate of 
inflation, an increase in the nominal interest rate given a real interest rate 
is equivalent to an increase in inflation. We would expect an increase in 
inflation to be associated with a higher level of real (and nominal) output. 
The association between the nominal interest rate and real output thus 
being picked up is the standard Phillips curve. But we are not picking up 
the hoped for relationship between the interest rate as determined by the 
government and the level of economic activity. 
84 A similar analysis, though, applies if we look beneath the surface, say to the 
relationship betv.reen investment or consumption and (real) interest rates -
the channel through which monetary policy is supposed to have much of 
its effect. Most studies (unmassaged) suggest that income and substitution 
effects are broadly offsetting. 
Credit and macroeconomic stability 179 
Bibliography 
Akerlof, George A., Blanchard, Olivier, Romer, David, & .Stiglit~, Joseph E. 
(eds.). (2014). What Have We Learned? Macroeconomic Policy after the 
Crisis. Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press. . . 
Akerlof George A., & Shiller, Robert J. (2015): Phishing for Phoolso Th.e Econ~mics of Manipulation and Deception. Princeton, NJ: Pnnceton Uni-
versity Press. . d S 1 Ch e 
Andrews, D. (2003). "Tests for Param~ter Insta~ihty an tr~ctura . ang_ 




·A A & M ans G. c. (1932). The Modern Corporation and Private 
Ber e, . ., e ' d W ld 2 d d 1967 p p rty New York NY: Harcourt, Brace an or , n e · · Bla:~h:rd,. Olivier, R~mer, J. D., Spence, .M., & Stiglitz, Joseph E. (eds.). 
(2012). In the Wake of the Crisis. Cambndge, MA, MIT Press. . . 
ff W (2003 November 10). "America's Growmg Trade Deficit ls Bu et, arren. ' p· h p bl And 
Selling the Nation out from Under Us. Here's a Way to ix t e ro em: 
We Need to Do It Now," Fortune. . . 
1 G ·11 A (1998) "Capital Flows and Capital-Market Cnseso The Ca vo, u1 ermo · · . · 1(1) 
· 1 E · of Sudden Stops " Journal of Applied Economics, . ' Simp e conom1cs ' 
35-54. 
Chapman, B., Higgins, T., & Stiglitz, Joseph E. (eds.). (2014). Income Con-
tingent Loans: Theory~ Practice and Prospects. Houndm1lls, UK and New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan. " . 
Dasgupta Partha & Stiglitz, Joseph E. (1977, December). Trnffs vs. Quo-
tas as :Revenue' Raising Devices Under Uncertainty," American Economic 
Review, 67(5)' 975-998. . . . h E 
DelliGatti, D., Gallegati, M., Greenwald,~'.' Russo, A., & St1ghtiz, Jose? ,; 
(2012). "Mobility Constraints, Product1~ity !rends, and Extended Cnses, 
Journal of Economic Behavior & Orgamzatwn, 83(3), 375-393: 
D 11.G tti· D Gallegati M. Greenwald, B., Russo, A., & Stightz, Joseph 
e 1 a ' ., ' ' · '' · Th Gl b l E (2016). "Sectoral Imbalances and Long Run Crises, i~ e. o ~ 
Macro Economy and Finance, F. Allen, M. Aoki, J.-P. Fitoussi, N. Kiyotak1, 
R. Gordon, and J. E. Stiglitz (eds.), !EA Conference Volume No. 150-III, 
Houndmills, UK and New York Palgrave, pp. 61-97. Ongmally presented 
at World Congress of !EA, Jordan, June 2014. . . 
Galbraith, James K. (2012). Inequality and Instabtltty: A Study.of the World 
Economy Just before the Great Crisis. New York: Oxford University Press. 
· · 01· · G (2014 March 3). "What Do We Know about the Giovannoni, ivier · ' l F 
Labor Share and the Profit Share? Part III: Measures and Structura ac-
tors," Bard College. . 
G1ovannon1, ivier · ' · · · 01· · G (2015 January 3) "Inequality' Challenge of the Cen-
tur ? " Presentation to the ASSA meetings, Boston. . . . . 
G y ' ld Bruce & Stiglitz Joseph E. (1986). "Externabtles m Economies 
reenwa , ' ' k ,, · h B G Id 
with Imperfect Information and Incomplete Mar ets, wit . reenwa , 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101(2)' 229-264. 
180 Joseph Stiglitz 
Greenwald, Bruce, & Stiglitz, Joseph E. (1989, May). "Toward a Theory of 
Rigidities," American Economic Review, 79(2): 364-369. 
Greenwald, Bruce, & Stiglitz,Joseph E. (1990). "Asymmetric Information and 
the New Theory of the Firm: Financial Constraints and Risk Behavior," The 
American Economic Review, 80(2): 160-165. 
Greenwald, Bruce, & Stiglitz, Joseph E. (1991, October). "Toward a Refor-
mulation of Monetary Theory: Competitive Banking," Economic and Social 
Review, 23(1): 1-34. Also NBER Working Paper 4117. 
Greenwald, Bruce, & Stiglitz, Joseph E. (1993a). "Financial Market Imperfec-
tions and Business Cycles," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108(1): 
77-114. 
Greenwald, Bruce, & Stiglitz, Joseph E. (1993b). "Monetary Policy and the 
Theory of the Risk-Averse Bank," Working Papers in Applied Economic 
Theory 93-04, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. 
Greenwald, Bruce, & Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2003). Towards a New Paradigm in 
Monetary Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Greenwald, Bruce, Stiglitz, Joseph E., & Weiss, Andrew. (1984, May). "Infor-
mational Imperfections in the Capital Market and Macroeconomic Fluc-
tuations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, 
74(2): 194-199. 
Guzman, Martin, & Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2013, December). "Monetary Policy 
and Capital Controls: Coordination in a World with Spillovers," Presented 
at the RIDGE Workshop at Central Bank of Uruguay. 
Guzman, Martin, & Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2015). "Pseudo-Wealth and Con-
sumption Fluctuations," Discussion paper, Columbia University. 
Guzman, Martin, & Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2016). "A Theory of Pseudo-Wealth," 
in Contemporary Issues in Macroeconomics: Lessons from the Crisis and 
Beyond, Joseph E. Stiglitz and Martin Guzman (eds.), IEA Conference Vol-
ume, No.155-II, Houndmills, UK and New York: Palgrave Macmillan. (Paper 
presented at a special session of the International Economic Association World 
Congress, Dead Sea, Jordan, June 2014, sponsored by the OECD.) 
Hahn, F. (1966). "Equilibrium Dynamics with Heterogeneous Capital Goods," 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, 80(4): 633-646. 
Kay, John. (2015). Other People's Money: The Real Business of Finance. Pub-
licAffairs. 
Kreamer, Jonathan. (2015). "Credit and Liquidity in the Macroeconomy," 
PhD Dissertation, University of Maryland, College Park. 
Neary, Peter, & Stiglitz, Joseph E. (1983). "Towards a Reconstruction of 
Keynesian Economics: Expectations and Constrained Equilibria," Quar-
terly Journal of Economics (Supplement}, 98: 199-228. 
Ohlin, B. (1937). "Some Notes on the Stockholm Theory of Savings and 
Investment II," The Economic journal, 47: 221-240. 
Robertson, D. H. (1934). "Industrial Fluctuation and the Natural Rate of 
Interest," The Economic journal, 44: 650-656. 
Shell, Karl, & Stiglitz, Joseph E. (1967, November). "Allocation of Investment 
in a Dynamic Economy," Quarterly journal of Economics, 81: 592-609. 
Credit and macroeconomic stability 181 
Stiglitz,Joseph E. (1985). "Credit Markets and the Control of Capital, "Journal 
of Money, Banking, and Credit, 17(2): 133-152. . . 
Stiglitz, Joseph E. (1988). "On the Relevance or Irrelevance. of Public Finan-
cial Policy," in The Economics of Public Debt, Proceedings o~ the 1986 
International Economics Association Meeting, London: Macmillan Press, 
pp. 4-76. . 
Stiglitz, Joseph E. (1994). Whither Socialism? Cambndge, MA: MIT Press. 
(Expanded from a paper presented at the Wicksell Lectures, May 1990) .. 
Stiglitz, Joseph E. (1998a). "More Instruments and Broader Goals: Moving 
Toward the Post-Washington Consensus," 1998 WIDER Annua_l Lecture, 
Helsinki, January; subsequently published in Development Issue~ tn the 21st 
Century, G. Kochendorfer Lucius and B. Pleskovic (eds.), Berlin: Germ~n 
Foundation for International Development, pp. 11-39; and Chapte~ l.1n 
The Rebel Within, Ha-Joon Chang (ed.), London: Wimbledon Pubhshmg 
Company, 2001, pp. 17-56. . . . ,, 
Stiglitz Joseph E. (1998b). "Central Banking in a Democratic Society, De 
Ecoi:omist (Netherlands), 146(2): 199-226. (Originally presented as 1997 
Tinbergen Lecture, Amsterdam, October). . . 
Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2002a). "Information and the Change m the Paradigm 
in Economics," abbreviated version of Nobel lecture, American Economic 
Review, 92(3): 460-501. 
Stiglitz1 Joseph E. (2002b). Globalization and Its Discontents, New York: W 
W. Norton & Company. . , 
Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2003). The Roaring Nineties: A New History of the Worlds 
Most Prosperous Decade. W.W. Norton & Company. . . 
Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2010). Freefall: America, Free Markets, and the Smkmg of 
the World Economy. W.W. Norton & Company. , . . . 
Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2012). The Price of Inequality: How Todays Divided Soci-
ety Endangers Our Future. WW. Norton & Company. . .. 
Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2014). "The Lessons of the North Atlantic Cns1s for Eco-
nomic Theory and Policy," in What Have We Learned? Macr~economtc 
Policy after the Crisis, George Akerlof, Olivier Blanchard, David Romer, 
and Joseph E. Stiglitz (eds.), Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 
pp. 335-347. . . 
Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2015a, April). "Fed Pdicy, foeq_uahty, and Equality of 
Opportunity," paper presented to the Ninth B1enn1al Fe~eral Reserve Sys-
tem Community Development Research Conference, Apnl 20~5, ~nd to be 
published in proceedings; available online at http://rooseveltinsntute.org/ 
fed -policy-inequality -and -eq uali ty-opportuni r:' I. . . . 
Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2015b, May). "New Theoretical Perspectives on the Dis~n­
bution of Income and Wealth Among Individuals: Part IV," NBER Working 
Papers 21192. 
Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2015c). "Monetary Policy in a Mul~ipolar World," in T~m­
ing Capital Flows: Capital Account Management tn an Era of Globaliza-
tion, Joseph E. Stiglitz and Refet S. Gurkaynak (e~s.), IEA Conference Vol-
ume No. 154, UK and New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
182 Joseph Stiglitz 
Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2015d). "New Theoretical Perspectives on the Distribution 
of Income and Wealth Among Individuals: Part I," NBER Working Papers 
21189, May. 
Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2016a). The Euro: How a Common Currency Threatens 
the Future of Europe. W.W. Norton & Company. 
Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2016b). "The Measurement of Wealth: Recessions, Sus-
tainability and Inequality," in Contemporary Issues in Macroeconomics: 
Lessons from The Crisis and Beyond, Joseph E. Stiglitz and Martin Guzman 
(eds.), !EA Conference Volume, No.155-II, Houndmills, UK and New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan. (also NBER Working Paper 21327, July 2015. Paper 
presented at a special session of the International Economic Association 
World Congress, Dead Sea, Jordan, June 2014 sponsored by the OECD.) 
Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2016c). "New Theoretical Perspectives on the Distribu-
tion of Income and Wealth among Individuals," in Inequality and Growth: 
Patterns and Policy, Volume I: Concepts and Analysis, Kaushik Basu and 
Joseph E. Stiglitz (eds.), !EA Conference Volume No. 156-1, Houndmills, 
UK and New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2016d). Towards a General Theory of Deep Downturns, 
IEA Conference Volume, 155-VI, Houndmills, UK and New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2016; previously NBER Working Paper 21444, August 2015 
and Presidential Address to the 17th World Congress of the International 
Economic Congress, Dead Sea, Jordan, June, 2014. 
Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2016e). "The State, the Market, and Development," to 
be published in Mapping Development Economics: The Past, Present and 
Future, Tony Addison and Finn Tarp (eds.) and WIDER Working Paper 
201611, January 2016, originally presented at UNU-WIDER 30th Anniver-
sary Conference held September 2015 in Helsinki, Finland, available online 
at www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/wp2016-1.pdf. 
Stiglitz, Joseph E., & Weiss, Andrew. (1981, June). "Credit Rationing in Mar-
kets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American 
Economic Association, 71(3): 393-410. 
Stiglitz, Joseph E., & Weiss, Andrew. (1986). "Credit Rationing and Collat-
eral," in Recent Developments in Corporate Finance, Jeremy Edwards et al. 
(eds.), New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 101-135. 
Stiglitz, Joseph E., & Yun, Jungyoll. (2013, May). "Optimal Provision of 
Loans and Insurance against Unemployment from a Lifetime Perspective," 
1 
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 19064. 
Stiglitz, Joseph E., & Yun, Jungyoll. (2014). "Income Contingent Loans for 
the Unemployed: A Prelude to a General Theory of the Efficient Provision 
of Social Insurance," in Income Contingent Loans: Theory, Practice and 
Prospects, Joseph E. Stiglitz, Bruce Chapman, and Timothy Higgins (eds.), 
Houndmills, UK and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 180-204. 
Stiglitz, Joseph E., & Yun, Jungyoll. (2016). "Income~Contingent Loan as an 
Unemployment Benefit," Columbia University working paper. 
Tobin, J. (1970). "Money and Income: Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc?," The 
Quarterly journal of Economics, 84(2): 301-317. 
Credit and macroeconomic stability 183 
Turner, Adair. (2015). Between Debt and the Devil: Money, Credit, and Fixing 
Global Finance, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Weitzman, Martin. (1974). "Prices vs. Quantities," Review of Economic Stud-
ies, 41(4): 477-491. 
Yellen, Janet. (2014, October 17). "Perspectives on Inequality and Opportu-
nity from the Survey of Consumer Finances," Remarks by Janet L. Yellen 
Chair Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System at the Conference 
on Economic Opportunity and Inequality Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 
Boston, MA. 
